

DEFINITIE CONFORM HRDD RAAMWERK

An institutional strategic partnership is a partnership where the Executive Board or Faculty Board needs to agree upon the partnership that transcends individual collaborative activities between academics, often including strategic university and/or faculty strategic objectives and that is formalised through a contract signed by the Executive Board or Faculty Board.

It may include:

- Formalised UM-wide participation in academic networks
- Faculty-to-faculty partnerships
- Commercial partnerships
- Partnerships on student and staff exchange

Individual activities between academics include:

- one-to-one joint research projects
- joint publications
- an individual guest lecture
- and individual consultancies

VRAGEN (vnl. vanuit de HRAC commissie):

5.2, 5.1 lid 2 i

5.2, 5.1 lid 2 i

OVERZICHT VAN HUIDIGE UM PARTNERSCHAPPEN MET ISRAEL

Uit onze interne analyse is gebleken dat we momenteel 20 samenwerkingen hebben met Israëlische partners of waarbij Israëlische partners een rol spelen. Het gaat om 6 categorieën partnerschappen:

1. 1 studentenuitwisseling met een Israëlische universiteit (nr 1)

5.2, 5.1 lid 2 i

2. 3 facultaire FHML-partnerschappen met een Israëlisch medisch centrum (nr 2 t/m 4)

5.2, 5.1 lid 2 i

3. 12 Horizon projecten (nr 5 t/m 16)

5.2, 5.1 lid 2 i

4. 1 ERC project (nr 17)

5.2, 5.1 lid 2 i

5. ASPHER (nr 18)

5.2, 5.1 lid 2 i

6. Project(en) van 5.1 lid 2 e (nr 19)

5.2, 5.1 lid 2 i

Partnerschappen met Israël (stavaza 02 06 2025):

5.2, 5.1 lid 2 i

5.2, 5.1 lid 2 i

	Faculteit	Start	Eind	Partner	Soort ovk	Institutionele samenwerking of Europees?	Omschrijving
1	FPN (faculteitsbreed)	16-7-2017	Geen datum	Hebrew University of Jerusalem	Uitwisselings-overeenkomst	Institutioneel (facultair)	Uitwisseling studenten
2 Maybe?	FHML	14-6-2022	14-6-2032	Enspire Science Ltd	Mutual NDA	Institutioneel (facultair)	Cooperation in submitting funding proposals. Enspire is een organisatie die <i>funding proposals</i> ontwikkelt (hoe kunnen we samenwerken op het gebied van onderzoek en hiervoor subsidies krijgen).
3	FHML	13-7-2023	As long as UM provides services plus 5 years	Itamar Medical Ltd	NDA	Institutioneel (facultair)	Discussing potential business relationship
4 Maybe?	FHML	16-9-2023	Geen einddatum	Rabin Medical Center	Research collaboration agreement	Institutioneel (facultair)	Mechanistic study in FXI deficient plasma to investigate the role of co-factors for the development of a bleeding phenotype

5	FHML (coordinator; individuele academicus)	1-3- 2021	26-2-2026	Tel Aviv University	Consortium agreement	Horizon 2020	5.1 lid 2 e
6	FHML (individuele academici)	1-6- 2021	31-5-2026	Bar-Ilan university	Consortium agreement	Horizon 2020	
7	FHML (coordinator; individuele academici)	1-11- 2021	31-10-2026	Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd.	Consortium Agreement	Horizon 2020	
8	FASoS (individuele academici)	1-3- 2023	28-2-2027	Hebrew University of Jerusalem	Consortium Agreement	Horizon 2020	
9	LAW (UM heeft het UM-deel al afgerond; moet enkel bijdragen aan eindrapport)	1-3- 2023	28-2-2026	University of Haifa	Consortium Agreement	Horizon 2020	
10	FPN	1-1- 2022	1-12-2025	Reichman University	Consortium Agreement (nog geen kopie van)	Horizon 2020	

11	FHML	1-6-2020	31-5-2025	Maccabi Sheirutei Briut Foundation	Consortium Agreement (nog geen kopie van)	Horizon 2020	5.1 lid 2 e
12	FHML	1-9-2024	31-8-2031	Ministry of Health, Israel; Bar-Ilan University	Consortium Agreement	Horizon 2020	
13	FHML	1-6-2021	31-5-2026	Clalit Health Services	Consortium Agreement	Horizon 2020	
14	FHML	1-12-2023	31-5-2027	Hadassah Medical Organization	Consortium Agreement	Horizon 2020	
15	FHML	1-1-2024	31-12-2028	The Health Corporation Rambam	Consortium Agreement	Horizon 2020	
16	FSE	1-11-2022	31-10-2025	Technion	Consortium Agreement (nog geen kopie van)	Horizon Europe	
17	FPN (individuele samenwerking)	1-11-2022	31-10-2027	Bar Ilan University		ERC research grant (persoonlijke grant), Consortium	

18	CAPHRI	Geen start datum in contract (lijkt 2020 te zijn)	Geen einddatum in contract	ASPHER	MoU Ondertekend door 5.1 lid 2 e	CAPHRI eenheid	Binnen ASPHER werkt de UM als volwaardig lid samen met een reeks andere partners (incl. 5 Israëlische universiteiten) en vindt samenwerking plaats tussen leden. De ASPHER website vermeldt dat FHML ASPHER-lid is; de MoU (gericht op o.a. gezamenlijk onderzoek, onderwijs en exchange) is tussen ASPHER, de American-Austrian Foundation en CAPHRI
19	Project van 5.1 lid 2 e	Info volgt	Info volgt	Israëlische partner	Ondertekend door decaan	Individueel, maar wordt ondernomen in consortium-verband	Info volgt

De volgende 3 partnerschappen hoeven we (meen ik) niet te toetsen:

a.	FHML (op de website van het consortium/centrum staat geen enkele link meer naar Hebrew University (waar maar 1 onderzoeker van meewerkte). ➤ Dit lijkt geen bestuurlijk strategisch partnerschap meer te betreffen met Israël.	1-3-2021	Geen einddatum (doorlopend)	Hebrew University	MoU regarding collaboration establishment Euregional Microbiome Centre	Consortium	5.1 lid 2 e
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b.	FHML (op de <u>website</u> van het consortium/centrum staat geen enkele link meer naar Hebrew University (waar maar 1 onderzoeker van meewerkte). > Dit lijkt geen strategisch bestuurlijk partnerschap meer te betreffen met Israël. Het contract heeft echter geen einddatum.	1-3-2021	Geen einddatum (doorlopend)	Hebrew University	MoU regarding collaboration establishment Euregional Microbiome Centre	Consortium	Samenwerking tussen consortium, en met vele individuele onderzoekers, incl. 1 onderzoeker van HUJ.
c.	FHML Loopt deze week formeel af	1-6-2023	31-5-2025	ImPact Biotech Ltd	Research collaboration agreement	Institutioneel	Pre-clinical study

buiten scope

From: Letschert, Rianne (CVB)
Sent: Sat, 31 May 2025 11:14:36 +0000
To: 5.1 lid 2 e
Cc: 5.1 lid 2 e
Subject: Re: HRDD Phase 1 Assessment Report: Israel/Palestine
Attachments: Draft_Phase 1_AdvRep_Israel_200525.pdf

Many thanks 5.1 lid 2 e. I will discuss it Tuesday with the EB and proceed accordingly.
Best Rianne

Met vriendelijke groet/Kind regards,

Prof.dr. Rianne Letschert
Bestuursvoorzitter/ President
Professor international law and victimology

5.1 lid 2 e

Op 30 mei 2025 om 12:21 heeft 5.1 lid 2 e
het volgende geschreven:

Dear Rianne,

Please find attached the Human Rights Advisory Committee's phase 1 report on Israel/Palestine for the Executive Board. In summary, we have concluded that there is sufficient evidence to formally proceed to phase 2 assessment of partners, and will now do so.

In line with the HRDD framework, we will notify the UM community that we are proceeding to phase 2 in our update next week, and we assume that the Board will inform relevant partner institutions. Please let us know if the Board has any feedback on the report.

Many thanks for your support with this process.

Kind regards

5.1 lid 2 e



Draft 20 May 2025

HRDD Phase 1 Country Assessment Report: Israel/Palestine

Submitted to the Executive Board by the Human Rights Advisory Committee (HRAC)

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Introduction

This report presents the findings of the Human Rights Advisory Committee (HRAC) under Phase 1 of the HRDD assessment for Israel/Palestine, the first country reviewed under the Committee's mandate. In line with Principle 6.4.1(b) of the Working Principles, the Committee has decided to issue a standalone Phase 1 report for this pilot assessment, reflecting its commitment to transparency and thorough documentation. This decision does not set a precedent for all future cases, which may be addressed through a single, consolidated report covering both phases.

In line with the principles outlined in Section 6 of the Working Principles, and in particular Principles 6.1 and 6.2.1, this report follows the structure set out in the HRDD Country Assessment Tool – Part 1.

Pursuant to its mandate to support Maastricht University in its commitment to contribute positively to the human rights situation in the world—especially where international crimes and serious human rights violations are concerned—this report aims to provide a clear and evidence-based foundation for the Executive Board’s next steps under the HRDD Framework.


1. What is the country’s score on the Human Rights Index?

The UN Universal Human Rights Index does not provide a single quantitative score. Instead, it compiles the number and nature of recommendations and observations issued by various UN human rights mechanisms. A search for Israel in the database returns 1,845 recommendations and observations, spanning 33 documents issued by 16 different mechanisms. While this does not constitute a score, it provides a contextual indication of the extent of international scrutiny and documentation regarding Israel’s human rights record.

2. What is the country’s score on the Academic Freedom Index?

In 2024, Israel scored 0.84 on the Academic Freedom Index (AFi), where the highest possible score is 1. This score is considered relatively high in global comparison. However, after decades of stability at 0.94 (from 1980 to 2022), the AFi score dropped by 0.103 between 2022 and 2024—a sudden shift that diverges from Israel’s previously consistent trend and warrants attention

Regarding Institutional Autonomy, a subcomponent of the AFi measured on a 0–4 scale, Israel scored 3.09 in 2024. This sub-score has declined since 2022, falling by 0.596 and interrupting a long-standing pattern of stability. These recent developments reflect a sharp and sudden weakening of academic freedom, albeit from a relatively strong baseline.



Screenshots taken on 20-21 May 2025.

3. Is the country involved in an armed conflict?

According to the [Global Conflict Tracker](#) maintained by the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations, Israel is involved in two major armed conflicts:

- The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, categorized as a worsening territorial dispute;
- An escalating interstate conflict with Hezbollah, a non-state armed group operating from Lebanon.

Additionally, as documented by the Rule of Law in Armed Conflicts (RULAC) project of the Geneva Academy, Israel is the occupying power in three internationally recognized occupations:

1. The Golan Heights, which are part of Syria;
2. The Shebaa Farms, which are part of Lebanon;
3. The West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip, which are part of Palestine.

While Israel withdrew its ground forces from Gaza in 2005, it continues to exercise significant control over the territory and is thus recognized as the occupying power under international law.

As of the current period, Israel is a party to multiple international armed conflicts—against Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria—and a non-international armed conflict with Hezbollah.

4. Are there (one or more) indications of serious violations taking place in the country?

The HRAC has concluded that there are serious indications that Israel has committed and continues to commit multiple international crimes and serious human rights violations, including:

- War crimes
- Crimes against humanity
- Potential acts of genocide

This conclusion is grounded in findings from institutions widely regarded as authoritative and independent in the field of international human rights and international criminal law, including:

- The International Court of Justice (ICJ) – *Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem* (19 July 2024); *Order on Provisional Measures in South Africa v. Israel* (26 January 2024)
- The International Criminal Court (ICC) – *Arrest Warrants issued by Pre-Trial Chamber I* (21 November 2024); *Appeals Chamber Decision on Jurisdiction Challenge* (24 April 2025)
- The UN Commission of Inquiry (COI) – *Reports on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and Israel* (14 June and 14 September 2024)
- The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) – *Report on the Human Rights Situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory* (A/HRC/58/28, February 2025); *Report on Israeli Settlements* (A/HRC/58/73, March 2025)
- The Hague Court of Appeal – *Judgment in Oxfam Novib et al. v. The Netherlands* (12 February 2024); Advice of Advocate General to Supreme Court (2 December 2024)

These findings are further corroborated by credible investigations and reports published by leading human rights NGOs, including:

- Human Rights Watch – *Extermination and Acts of Genocide: Israel Deliberately Depriving Palestinians in Gaza of Water* (December 2024); *A Threshold Crossed: Israeli Authorities and the Crimes of Apartheid and Persecution* (January 2021)
- Amnesty International – *The State of the World's Human Rights 2024* (April 2024)

In addition, the HRAC notes that there are also serious indications that war crimes and crimes against humanity have been committed in the State of Israel by Hamas - *Arrest Warrants issued by Pre-Trial Chamber I* (21 November 2024).

Taken together, these sources constitute a robust and deeply corroborated body of evidence that not only meets but exceeds the evidentiary threshold set by the HRDD Framework for establishing serious indications of international crimes and serious human rights violations committed in and by Israel.

A summary and analysis of the main sources of evidence relied upon for this conclusion is provided in Annex I, while Annex II presents relevant excerpts from the decisions, reports, and findings of the institutions and bodies cited above.

Conclusion

Based on its mandate under the HRDD Framework and Working Principles, and drawing on a wide range of impartial, independent, authoritative, as well as corroborated sources (see annexes), the HRAC concludes that there are serious indications that Israel has committed and continues to commit international crimes and serious human rights violations, including war crimes, crimes against humanity, and potential acts of genocide.

These findings meet and exceed the evidentiary threshold set out in the HRDD Framework for advancing from Phase 1 (country-level assessment) to Phase 2 (partner-level assessment). In line with this conclusion, the HRAC will now proceed to assess whether there are serious indications that partner institutions located in Israel are contributing to these violations.

The HRAC having reached the conclusion that the threshold for Phase 1 has been met, the HRDD Framework foresees that the Executive Board enter into contact with relevant institutions in Israel to inform them that the University is proceeding to Phase 2 of the assessment. The HRAC would appreciate being kept informed about any responses received and other relevant information arising from this engagement with partner institutions.

This report is intended to inform the Executive Board's decision-making. The HRAC has/will also share a summary of the findings of Phase 1 for communication to the broader University community.

Annex I Summary and Analysis of Evidence

There are serious indications that Israel has committed, and continues to commit, multiple international crimes and serious human rights violations. These include war crimes, crimes against humanity, and potentially acts of genocide.

The International Court of Justice (ICJ), in its Advisory Opinion of 19 July 2024, found that Israel's policies in the Occupied Palestinian Territory—such as settlement expansion, forcible transfer, discriminatory laws, and prolonged occupation—violate international law and amount to annexation, racial segregation, and breaches of the right to self-determination. In its Provisional Measures Order of 26 January 2024, the Court concluded that it is plausible that the rights of Palestinians in Gaza to be protected from genocide are at risk.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants on 21 November 2024 for Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defense Minister Gallant, finding reasonable grounds to believe they bear responsibility for starvation as a method of warfare (a war crime), murder and inhumane acts (crimes against humanity), and persecution and attacks against civilians. These findings concern acts allegedly committed in Gaza between October 2023 and May 2024. In April 2025, the Appeals Chamber confirmed that while jurisdictional issues are pending, the warrants remain valid.

The ICC Pre-Trial Chamber also issued an arrest warrant for Mohammed Diab Ibrahim Al-Masri (known as “Deif”), the highest commander of Hamas’s al-Qassam Brigades, for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Israel and Palestine from at least 7 October 2023. On 26 February 2025, ICC Pre-trial Chamber I terminated proceedings against Mohammed Diab Ibrahim Al-Masri (Deif) following the Prosecution’s notification of his death.

The UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry, in its June and September 2024 reports, found war crimes including wilful killing, attacks on protected objects, and destruction of healthcare infrastructure, as well as crimes against humanity such as extermination, torture, and gender persecution—applying a “reasonable grounds to believe” standard.

Reports by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in February and March 2025 confirm widespread and systematic violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, including policies of apartheid, forcible transfer, and collective punishment—notably of children.

The Hague Court of Appeal, in a February 2024 judgment, held that there is a “clear risk” that F-35 components exported from the Netherlands to Israel would be used to commit serious violations of international humanitarian law, based on Israeli conduct in recent operations. This ruling, now under appeal, was based on a precautionary standard, not conclusive proof. On 29 November 2024, the Advocate General has recommended to the Supreme Court that the Court of Appeal’s decision—requiring the Dutch State to cease exports of F-35 parts to Israel—be upheld.

These findings are corroborated by reputable human rights organizations. Human Rights Watch (Dec. 2024) concluded that Israel committed the crime against humanity of extermination and possibly acts of genocide. Amnesty International (Apr. 2024) documented deepened apartheid, mass displacement in Gaza, and systemic abuses in both the Occupied Palestinian Territory and within Israel. Human Rights Watch (2021) previously found that Israel's repression of Palestinians amounts to crimes against humanity of apartheid and persecution.

Annex II - Excerpts

International Court of Justice (ICJ)

Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem

International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion of 19 July 2024

Paragraph 119:

“the Court considers that the transfer by Israel of settlers to the West Bank and East Jerusalem, as well as Israel's maintenance of their presence, is contrary to the sixth paragraph of Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.”

Paragraph 133:

“the Court also concludes that Israel's policy of exploitation of natural resources in the Occupied Palestinian Territory is inconsistent with its obligation to respect the Palestinian people's right to permanent sovereignty over natural resources.”

Paragraph 147:

“The Court considers that Israel's policies and practices, which it discusses in greater detail below (see paragraphs 180-229), including its forcible evictions, extensive house demolitions and restrictions on residence and movement, often leave little choice to members of the Palestinian population living in Area C but to leave their area of residence. The nature of Israel's acts, including the fact that Israel frequently confiscates land following the demolition of Palestinian property for reallocation to Israeli settlements, indicates that its measures are not temporary in character and therefore cannot be considered as permissible evacuations. In the Court's view, Israel's policies and practices are contrary to the prohibition of forcible transfer of the protected population under the first paragraph of Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.”

Paragraph 154:

“The Court considers that the violence by settlers against Palestinians, Israel's failure to prevent or to punish it effectively and its excessive use of force against Palestinians contribute to the creation and maintenance of a coercive environment against Palestinians. In the present case, on the basis of the evidence before it, the Court is of the view that Israel's systematic failure to prevent or to punish attacks by settlers against the life or bodily integrity of Palestinians, as well as Israel's excessive use of

force against Palestinians, is inconsistent with the obligations identified in paragraph 149 above.”

Paragraph 173:

“In light of the above, the Court is of the view that Israel’s policies and practices, including the maintenance and expansion of settlements, the construction of associated infrastructure, including the wall, the exploitation of natural resources, the proclamation of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, the comprehensive application of Israeli domestic law in East Jerusalem and its extensive application in the West Bank, entrench Israel’s control of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, notably of East Jerusalem and of Area C of the West Bank. These policies and practices are designed to remain in place indefinitely and to create irreversible effects on the ground. Consequently, the Court considers that these policies and practices amount to annexation of large parts of the Occupied Palestinian Territory.”

Paragraph 179:

“The Court has found that Israel’s policies and practices amount to annexation of large parts of the Occupied Palestinian Territory. It is the view of the Court that to seek to acquire sovereignty over an occupied territory, as shown by the policies and practices adopted by Israel in East Jerusalem and the West Bank, is contrary to the prohibition of the use of force in international relations and its corollary principle of the non-acquisition of territory by force.”

Paragraph 197:

“the Court is of the view that Israel’s residence permit policy amounts to prohibited discrimination under Articles 2, paragraph 2, 23 and 26 of the ICCPR, and Articles 2, paragraph 2, and 10, paragraph 1, of the ICESCR.”

Paragraph 206:

“the Court is of the view that Israel’s policies restricting freedom of movement amount to prohibited discrimination under Articles 2, paragraph 1, and 26 of the ICCPR, Article 2, paragraph 2, of the ICESCR, and Article 2 of CERD.”

Paragraph 213:

“Israel’s practice of punitive demolitions of Palestinian property, being contrary to its obligations under international humanitarian law, does not serve a legitimate public aim. The Court considers that, because this practice treats Palestinians differently without justification, it amounts to prohibited discrimination under Articles 2, paragraph 1, and 26 of the ICCPR, Article 2, paragraph 2, of the ICESCR, and Article 2 of CERD.”

Paragraph 222:

“the Court considers that Israel’s planning policy in relation to the issuance of building permits, and in particular its practice of property demolition for lack of a building permit, which treats Palestinians differently from settlers without justification, amounts to prohibited discrimination, in violation of Articles 2,

paragraph 1, and 26 of the ICCPR, Article 2, paragraph 2, of the ICESCR, and Article 2 of CERD.”

Paragraph 229:

“229. The Court observes that Israel’s legislation and measures impose and serve to maintain a near-complete separation in the West Bank and East Jerusalem between the settler and Palestinian communities. For this reason, the Court considers that Israel’s legislation and measures constitute a breach of Article 3 of CERD.”

Article 3 of CERD provides as follows:

“States Parties particularly condemn racial segregation and apartheid and undertake to prevent, prohibit and eradicate all practices of this nature in territories under their jurisdiction.”

This provision refers to two particularly severe forms of racial discrimination: racial segregation and apartheid.

Paragraph 243:

“The prolonged character of Israel’s unlawful policies and practices aggravates their violation of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination. As a consequence of Israel’s policies and practices, which span decades, the Palestinian people has been deprived of its right to self-determination over a long period, and further prolongation of these policies and practices undermines the exercise of this right in the future. For these reasons, the Court is of the view that Israel’s unlawful policies and practices are in breach of Israel’s obligation to respect the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination.”

Paragraph 261:

“The Court considers that the violations by Israel of the prohibition of the acquisition of territory by force and of the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination have a direct impact on the legality of the continued presence of Israel, as an occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. The sustained abuse by Israel of its position as an occupying Power, through annexation and an assertion of permanent control over the Occupied Palestinian Territory and continued frustration of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, violates fundamental principles of international law and renders Israel’s presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory unlawful.”

Provisional Order of 26 January 2024, South Africa v. Israel
International Court of Justice

Paragraph 54:

“the facts and circumstances mentioned above are sufficient to conclude that at least some of the rights claimed by South Africa and for which it is seeking protection are plausible. This is the case with respect to the right of the Palestinians in Gaza to be protected from acts of genocide and related prohibited acts identified in Article III, and the right of South Africa to seek Israel’s compliance with the latter’s obligations under the Convention.”

International Criminal Court – Situation in the State of Palestine

Press Release – 21 November 2024

Situation in the State of Palestine: ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I rejects the State of Israel's challenges to jurisdiction and issues warrants of arrest for Benjamin Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant

"[O]n 21 November 2024, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court ('Court'), in its composition for the Situation in the State of Palestine, unanimously issued two decisions rejecting challenges by the State of Israel ('Israel') brought under articles 18 and 19 of the Rome Statute (the 'Statute'). It also issued warrants of arrest for Mr Benjamin Netanyahu and Mr Yoav Gallant."

"The Chamber issued warrants of arrest for two individuals, Mr Benjamin Netanyahu and Mr Yoav Gallant, for crimes against humanity and war crimes committed from at least 8 October 2023 until at least 20 May 2024, the day the Prosecution filed the applications for warrants of arrest. The arrest warrants are classified as 'secret', in order to protect witnesses and to safeguard the conduct of the investigations."

"The Chamber considered that there are reasonable grounds to believe that both individuals intentionally and knowingly deprived the civilian population in Gaza of objects indispensable to their survival, including food, water, and medicine and medical supplies, as well as fuel and electricity, from at least 8 October 2023 to 20 May 2024. This finding is based on the role of Mr Netanyahu and Mr Gallant in impeding humanitarian aid in violation of international humanitarian law and their failure to facilitate relief by all means at its disposal. The Chamber found that their conduct led to the disruption of the ability of humanitarian organisations to provide food and other essential goods to the population in need in Gaza."

"The aforementioned restrictions together with cutting off electricity and reducing fuel supply also had a severe impact on the availability of water in Gaza and the ability of hospitals to provide medical care. The Chamber therefore found reasonable grounds to believe that Mr Netanyahu and Mr Gallant bear criminal responsibility for the war crime of starvation as a method of warfare."

"The Chamber found that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the lack of food, water, electricity and fuel, and specific medical supplies, created conditions of life calculated to bring about the destruction of part of the civilian population in Gaza, which resulted in the death of civilians, including children due to malnutrition and dehydration."

"On the basis of material presented by the Prosecution covering the period until 20 May 2024, [...] the Chamber found that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the crime against humanity of murder was committed in relation to these victims."

"In addition, by intentionally limiting or preventing medical supplies and medicine from getting into Gaza, in particular anaesthetics and anaesthesia machines, the two individuals are

also responsible for inflicting great suffering by means of inhumane acts on persons in need of treatment. Doctors were forced to operate on wounded persons and carry out amputations, including on children, without anaesthetics, and/or were forced to use inadequate and unsafe means to sedate patients, causing these persons extreme pain and suffering. This amounts to the crime against humanity of other inhumane acts."

"The Chamber also found reasonable grounds to believe that the abovementioned conduct deprived a significant portion of the civilian population in Gaza of their fundamental rights, including the rights to life and health, and that the population was targeted based on political and/or national grounds. It therefore found that the crime against humanity of persecution was committed."

"Finally, the Chamber assessed that there are reasonable grounds to believe that Mr Netanyahu and Mr Gallant bear criminal responsibility as civilian superiors for the war crime of intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population of Gaza."

Press Release - 21 November 2024

Situation in the State of Palestine: Warrant of Arrest for Mohammed Diab Ibrahim Al-Masri ('Deif')

"On 21 November 2024, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court ('Court'), in its composition for the Situation in the State of Palestine, unanimously issued a warrant of arrest for Mr Mohammed Diab Ibrahim Al-Masri, commonly known as 'Deif', for alleged crimes against humanity and war crimes committed on the territory of the State of Israel and the State of Palestine from at least 7 October 2023."

ICC Appeals Chamber Decision – 24 April 2025

Appeals Chamber remands jurisdiction challenge back to Pre-Trial Chamber

On 24 April 2025, the ICC Appeals Chamber reversed the earlier Pre-Trial Chamber decision on Israel's jurisdictional challenge and remanded the matter for reconsideration.

- The decision does not contest the substance of the arrest warrants or the finding of reasonable grounds to believe the crimes were committed.
- It specifically concerns whether the ICC has jurisdiction over Israeli nationals.
- The arrest warrants remain valid and are not suspended, as they are based on a distinct decision.
- However, if the Pre-Trial Chamber ultimately finds that the Court lacks jurisdiction over Israeli nationals, the warrants could be rendered ultra vires (beyond the Court's legal authority).

Despite this jurisdictional uncertainty, the Pre-Trial Chamber's finding remains: there are reasonable grounds to believe that Netanyahu and Gallant are responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Gaza.

Reports of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and Israel
Established by Human Rights Council Resolution S-30/1 (28 May 2021)

The methodology and standard of proof applied by the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and Israel are detailed in its terms of reference. The Commission explains:

“In the course of its work, the Commission has decided to adopt the same standard of proof as the majority of international commissions of inquiry on human rights, that is one of ‘reasonable grounds’. This means that findings will be included in the reports where the ‘reasonable grounds’ standard of proof has been met, namely where, based on a body of verified information, an objective and ordinarily prudent observer would have reasonable grounds to conclude that the facts took place as described and, where legal conclusions are drawn, that these facts meet all the elements of a violation or abuse, and any individual identified is responsible for the violation or abuse. In applying the standard of proof adopted, the Commission will pay particular attention to corroborating relevant information it receives or has collected. It will do so by verifying every piece of information by obtaining consistent information from at least two other independent and reliable sources. In some cases, information provided by a reliable primary source may need to be corroborated by only one additional independent and reliable source, which may include the investigator’s own findings.”

Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and Israel
Established by Human Rights Council Resolution S-30/1 (28 May 2021)
Report submitted to the Human Rights Council – 14 June 2024
UN Doc. A/HRC/56/26

This report examines violations of international human rights law, international humanitarian law, and possible international crimes committed by all parties between 7 October and 31 December 2023.

Paragraph 80:

“In relation to the Commission’s investigation into Israeli attacks and operations in Gaza and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the Commission found that Israeli authorities and members of the Israeli security forces had committed war crimes, crimes against humanity and violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law.”

Paragraph 81:

“The Commission found that the war crimes of starvation as a method of warfare; murder or wilful killing; intentionally directing attacks against civilians and civilian objects; forcible transfer; sexual violence; outrages upon personal dignity; and sexual and gender-based violence amounting to torture or inhuman and cruel treatment had been committed.”

Paragraph 82:

“The Commission found that through several actions, including siege, Israel had inflicted collective punishment on the Palestinian population in Gaza, in direct violation of international humanitarian law.”

Paragraph 83:

“The Commission found it foreseeable that civilians would be present in the areas targeted by the Israeli security forces; nonetheless, the Israeli security forces intentionally proceeded to direct its attacks against the civilian population and civilian objects, including places of worship, with such knowledge, in direct violation of the principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution and special protections for women and children under international humanitarian law.”

Paragraph 84:

“The Commission found that the chapeau elements of crimes against humanity had been fulfilled, namely widespread or systematic attacks directed against the civilian population in Gaza. The Commission found that the crimes against humanity of extermination; murder; gender persecution targeting Palestinian men and boys; forcible transfer; and torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment had been committed.”

Paragraph 85:

“The Commission found that the siege and forcible transfer of the population, compounded by widespread destruction caused by attacks and military operations, had resulted in violations of international human rights law, including the rights to family life, adequate food, housing, education, health, social security and water and sanitation, affecting children and persons in vulnerable situations in particular. The age- and gender-specific harms had resulted in violations of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and rights to non-discrimination under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.”

Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and Israel

Established by Resolution A/HRC/RES/S-30/1 of the Human Rights Council on 28 May 2021

Report submitted to the General Assembly – 11 September 2024

UN Doc. A/79/232

This report examines the treatment of detainees and hostages, and attacks on medical facilities and personnel between 7 October 2023 and August 2024.

Paragraph 89:

“The Commission finds that Israel has implemented a concerted policy to destroy the health-care system of Gaza. Israeli security forces have deliberately killed, wounded, arrested, detained, mistreated and tortured medical personnel and targeted medical vehicles, constituting the war crimes of wilful killing and mistreatment and the crime against humanity of extermination. Israeli authorities carried out such acts while tightening the siege of the Gaza Strip, resulting in fuel, food, water, medicines and medical supplies not reaching hospitals, while also drastically reducing permits for

patients to leave the territory for medical treatment. The Commission finds that these actions were taken as collective punishment against the Palestinians in Gaza and are part of the ongoing Israeli attack against the Palestinian people that began on 7 October.”

Paragraph 91:

“In relation to the attacks on Nasr, Shifa’, Awdah and Turkish hospitals, the Commission finds that, in view of the excessive number of civilian deaths and injuries, as well as the damage caused to and the destruction of the hospitals’ facilities, Israeli security forces failed to adhere to the principles of precaution, distinction and proportionality, constituting the war crimes of wilful killing and attacks against protected objects. The Commission finds that, in the attacks on Shifa’ and Nasr hospitals, Israeli security forces considered the hospitals’ premises and all surrounding areas as targetable without distinction and thus violated the principle of distinction. With regard to Israeli security forces seizing the Turkish Hospital for military purposes and establishing a military post therein, the Commission finds that such actions were not required by the imperative of military necessity and thus amount to the war crime of seizing protected property.”

Paragraph 95:

“In relation to the 29 January attack on a family, including five children, that was in a vehicle and on a Palestine Red Crescent Society ambulance (see para. 11), the Commission, based on its investigation, concludes on reasonable grounds that the 162 Division of the Israeli security forces was operating in the area and is responsible for killing the family of seven, as well as for shelling the ambulance, killing the two paramedics who were inside. Those actions constitute the war crimes of wilful killing and an attack against civilian objects.”

Paragraph 97:

“The Commission finds that the deliberate destruction of sexual and reproductive health-care facilities constitutes reproductive violence and has had a particularly harmful effect on pregnant, post-partum and lactating women, who remain at high risk of injury and death. Targeting such infrastructure is a violation of women and girls’ reproductive rights and the rights to life, health, human dignity and non-discrimination. In addition, it has caused immediate physical and mental harm and suffering to women and girls and will have irreversible long-term effects on the mental health and the physical reproductive and fertility prospects of the Palestinian people as a group.”

Paragraph 98:

“Intentionally targeting facilities that are crucial for the health and protection of women, newborns and children violated the norm of customary international humanitarian law that affords special protection to women and children in armed conflicts. Such harmful acts were both foreseeable and unremedied. The prolonged physical and mental suffering of injured children and the reproductive harm caused to pregnant, post-partum and lactating women amount to the crime against humanity of other inhumane acts.”

Paragraph 99:

“The Commission finds that Israeli security forces resorted to perfidy when soldiers entered a hospital in Jenin dressed as medical staff and female civilians on 30 January. That action constitutes a violation of international humanitarian law.”

Paragraph 102:

“Mistreatment of Palestinian detainees by Israeli authorities is the result of an intentional policy. Acts of physical, psychological, sexual and reproductive violence were perpetrated to humiliate and degrade Palestinians. This was observed across several facilities and temporary holding locations, as well as during interrogation and while in transit to and from facilities. Detainees, including older persons and children, were subjected to consistent mistreatment, including lack of sufficient food and appropriate hygiene facilities, beatings, abusive language and being forced to perform humiliating acts. Israeli security forces committed those acts with the intent to inflict pain and suffering, amounting to torture as a war crime and a crime against humanity and constituting a violation of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. The deaths of detainees as a result of abuse or neglect amount to the war crimes of wilful killing or murder and violations of the right to life.”

Paragraph 103:

“This systematic abuse is directly and causally linked to statements made by Israeli officials, including the Minister of National Security, who is responsible for the Israel Prison Service, and other members of the Israeli coalition Government legitimizing revenge and violence against Palestinians. The lack of accountability for actions of individual members of the Israeli security forces and the increasing acceptance of violence against Palestinians have allowed such conduct to continue uninterrupted and become systematic and institutionalized.”

Paragraph 108:

“As the intensity of the hostilities increased, so did the prevalence and types of sexual and gender-based violence committed. In its previous report to the Human Rights Council (A/HRC/56/26), the Commission identified persecutory acts committed against Palestinian men and boys, including the filming of forced public stripping and nudity. The Commission finds that such persecutory acts continued in detention in the form of sexualized torture. Male detainees were subjected to attacks on their sexuality and reproductive organs, including violence to their genitals and anus, and were forced to perform humiliating and strenuous acts naked or stripped as a form of punishment or intimidation, with a view to extract information from them. Male detainees were subjected to rape, which is a war crime and a crime against humanity. Such acts of sexual violence, causing severe physical and mental suffering, also amount to torture.”

United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

Israeli Settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the Occupied Syrian Golan - Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for

Paragraph 13:

“During the reporting period, there was significant consolidation and expansion of Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank, including East Jerusalem. All Israeli settlements are illegal under international law because they amount to the transfer by Israel of its population into an occupied territory. The maintenance and expansion of Israeli settlements also advances the integration of Palestinian territory into Israel, forming part of the policies and practices that amount to annexation of large parts of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, in violation of the prohibition on the acquisition of territory by force. Israeli settlements also fragment the remaining areas of the West Bank and disconnect the West Bank from Jerusalem, further inhibiting the fulfilment of Palestinians’ right to self-determination within a contiguous State.”

Pursuant to article 8 (2)(b)(viii) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, the transfer by the occupying Power of parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies, or the deportation or transfer of all or parts of the population of the occupied territory within or outside this territory, amounts to a war crime.

Paragraph 20:

“Israel continued the illegal appropriation of land for Israeli settlements in the occupied territory through declarations of ‘State land’, as well as the establishment of military zones, nature reserves and cultural and archaeological sites. This illegal appropriation remained one of the key tools for dispossession and the forcible transfer of Palestinians from their land, while enabling the transfer of the Israeli civilian population to those lands.”

Paragraph 23:

“In East Jerusalem, Israel continues to take measures to transfer its civilian population to this occupied territory and to forcibly transfer Palestinians within and from the occupied territory. These measures also isolate East Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank and further undermine the drawing of a border for a Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem, as part of the denial by Israel of Palestinians’ right to self-determination.”

Paragraph 25:

“The Israeli authorities have also started including the settlement of land title as an additional requirement for obtaining building permits in East Jerusalem, which are already almost impossible for Palestinians to obtain due to a discriminatory building permit scheme. The settlement of land title supplements other discriminatory laws, including the 1950 Absentee Property Law and the 1970 Legal and Administrative Matters Law, which enables the confiscation of Palestinian property and the advancement of Israeli settlement and forms part of the broader discriminatory legislation and measures implemented by Israel that constitute a breach of article 3 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.”

Paragraph 33:

“The denial by Israel of access by Palestinians to their agricultural lands for the harvest forms part of the coercive environment that induces their departure, and which may amount to forcible transfer. The unlawful expropriation and exploitation by Israel of these lands and their natural resources and the displacement of the Palestinian population also form part of Israeli policies and practices that amount to annexation of large parts of the Occupied Palestinian Territory and the violation of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination.”

Paragraph 40:

“The systematic failure of Israel to prevent or punish attacks by settlers against the life or bodily integrity of Palestinians, as well as its excessive use of force against Palestinians, not only violates their rights to life and to be protected against all threats or acts of violence but also continues to be fundamental to the creation and maintenance by Israel of a coercive environment of violence, discrimination and oppression that induces forcible transfer, enabling annexation and the denial of Palestinians’ right to self-determination.”

Paragraph 51:

“The increasingly blurred line between State and settler violence is leaving Palestinians bereft of any legal recourse and of any hope of obtaining justice and accountability. Exacerbating the already prevalent impunity documented by OHCHR, the Minister of National Security reportedly instituted a policy of police non-enforcement of the law in relation to violent settlers.”

Paragraph 54:

“The forcible transfer of the Palestinian population in occupied territory continued not only through physical force, including settler violence, but also through an overarching institutional and legal regime of discrimination and oppression that leaves Palestinians no choice but to leave. This includes a regime of forced evictions and house demolitions that, under the Settlement Administration, was enforced with increased vigour against Palestinian construction during the reporting period. A policy of non-enforcement was reportedly put in place vis-à-vis illegal Israeli construction.”

Paragraph 60:

“The establishment and continuing expansion of settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and the occupied Syrian Golan amount to the transfer by Israel of its own civilian population into the territories that it occupies, which is strictly prohibited under international law.”

Paragraph 61:

“The ongoing transfer of power over the Occupied Palestinian Territory to the civilian Government of Israel is facilitating the further consolidation and expansion of Israeli settlements and the forcible transfer of the Palestinian population. Increasingly indistinguishable State-settler violence and wide-ranging and discriminatory movement restrictions, which devastated Palestinian livelihoods during the reporting

period, are both causes and manifestations of the Israeli settlement advancement that continued to change the demographic composition of the occupied territory and to annex territory. This has had dire consequences for the human rights of the Palestinian people, including the denial of their right to self-determination, through an institutionalized regime of systematic discrimination, violence and oppression by Israel. This regime violates a wide range of other human rights, including those set out in article 3 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.”

Human Rights Situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the Obligation to Ensure Accountability and Justice - Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 13 February 2025

UN Doc. A/HRC/58/28 – Submitted pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution 55/28

“Unless otherwise stated, the information in the present report is drawn from OHCHR monitoring conducted in line with OHCHR methodological standards.”

Paragraph 4:

“the human rights situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory worsened to an unprecedented extent, raising concerns of patterns of systematic violations of principles of international humanitarian law on the conduct of hostilities, many amounting to war crimes. The manner in which parties to the conflict in Gaza have conducted hostilities during the reporting period, especially the choices by Israel of methods and means of warfare, have involved an unprecedented disregard for international humanitarian law and international human rights law and, as the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has repeatedly warned, raised concerns over the commission of war crimes and other possible atrocity crimes. Concerns over the commission of further atrocity crimes intensified during the Israeli military’s operations in North Gaza from October 2024.”

Paragraph 5:

“In the West Bank, the use of unnecessary and disproportionate force by Israel against Palestinians, including the unlawful use of methods and means developed for warfare, escalated dramatically in both intensity and frequency, while attacks by armed settlers, supported by Israeli forces, intensified. State and settler violence and a de facto policy of colonization contributed to further entrenchment of a discriminatory system amounting to segregation and oppression of Palestinians in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, in violation of article 3 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which obliges States parties to prevent, prohibit and eradicate all practices of segregation and apartheid.”

Paragraph 12:

“Most civilian deaths appear to have resulted from the parties’ choices of methods and means of warfare. Israel continued to launch strikes using weapons with wide-area effects in densely populated areas and attacked prima facie civilian objects, including residential buildings, schools and hospitals, in many cases providing little or no information as to how they could be considered lawful military objectives. Individual strikes and the broader targeting practices of Israel evinced a lack of compliance with fundamental principles of international humanitarian law, including distinction, encompassing the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks, such as area bombardment,

proportionality and precautions in attack. Multiple specific Israeli attacks may amount to war crimes for failure to comply with these principles.”

Paragraph 15:

“While Israel frequently stated that it had targeted military objectives in its attacks, its conduct nonetheless often appeared inconsistent with the principles of proportionality and/or precautions in attack. On 27 July 2024, the Israeli Air Force struck Khadija School in the west of the city of Deir al Balah, which was sheltering hundreds of displaced persons and was serving as a field hospital. A rapid series of strikes killed at least 30 Palestinians, according to the Ministry of Health of the State of Palestine, with multiple air-dropped munitions destroying or damaging several buildings. The Israeli military issued a warning to those present ahead of the second and third air strikes, but not the first, in which most of the casualties had reportedly occurred. The majority of those killed appeared to have been women and children. Fatalities included a child in an adjacent house, eight individuals in a vendors’ area by the school walls, and, reportedly, four individuals driving a cart nearby. The Israeli military stated that it had targeted Hamas “terrorists” and weapons storage and development facilities inside the school. However, the large number of civilians expected to be present in a school used as shelter raises serious doubts as to whether the expected casualties of such a strike were proportionate to the anticipated military advantage gained from the objective stated by the Israeli military.”

Paragraph 16:

“An Israeli air strike on 10 September 2024 in Al Mawasi, Khan Younis, which Israel had unilaterally designated as a humanitarian zone, killed nine people, many of them sleeping in tents, including two women and five children. Israel subsequently stated that the attack had targeted “senior Hamas members”. One young girl was decapitated by the force of the strike, which, analysis indicates, may have included at least one Mark 84 bomb, an air-dropped munition designed to penetrate through several floors of concrete. The use of such heavy weapons in a tent encampment appears to be a breach of the obligation of Israel to take all feasible precautions in attack and raises serious concerns about compliance with the principle of proportionality.”

Paragraph 17:

“Israel maintained a pattern of strikes on areas potentially containing military targets that destroyed or severely damaged wide swaths of surrounding urban terrain, raising concerns about indiscriminate attacks, including area bombardment, with the result and possible intention of rendering areas uninhabitable. The Israel Defense Forces conducted a major operation in Al Shifa medical complex in Gaza City between 18 March and 1 April 2024, including air strikes and shelling, completely destroying the hospital facilities and severely damaging the surrounding residential area. At least 175 buildings were destroyed and another 52 severely damaged within a 1-km radius of the medical complex between 1 and 31 March 2024, according to analysis by the United Nations Satellite Centre. According to additional analysis, another Israeli operation in Jabalya camp in North Gaza, a densely populated area of 1.4 km², between 11 and 31 May 2024, largely levelled parts of the camp and likely destroyed or damaged 460 buildings.”

Paragraph 19:

“The risk of forcible transfer was particularly acute in northern Gaza, which Israel has repeatedly ordered Palestinians to leave since 12 October 2023, while preventing the return of those displaced. In October 2024, Israel issued five orders for the population of North Gaza and parts of Gaza City to relocate southward, while besieging parts of these areas and preventing people from fleeing. The wide-ranging, frequently non-specific nature of Israeli displacement orders, alongside the lack of reported Palestinian armed group activity in some areas under displacement orders, indicate a likely absence of imperative military reasons for such displacement. Moreover, attacks by Israel on those trying to comply with these orders and continued attacks on the crowded “humanitarian zone” indicate that displacements have not been driven by concerns for their safety. Israel has also failed for over a year to provide those displaced with accommodation or to ensure their access to the necessities of life. The protracted nature of the displacement, the continued obstacles to returning home and the wide-scale destruction of housing, particularly in the north, call into question the temporariness of the displacement. Taken together, these elements appear to indicate that the Israeli military is conducting mass forcible transfer with the possible goal of permanently displacing Palestinians from, at least, northern Gaza.”

Paragraph 20:

“The Israel Defense Forces have targeted civilian officials and public buildings, dismantling governance, administrative and law enforcement structures in Gaza with devastating consequences for the population. Israel has asserted that all members of Hamas, including members of its civilian wing, are legitimate military targets. Under international humanitarian law, civilians are protected against attack, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities (ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law Database, rule 6). Members of the Government of Israel have consistently stated their objective of destroying the governing capacity of Hamas.”

Paragraph 30:

“Israeli security forces resorted extensively to the use of lethal force that was unlawful because it was unnecessary or disproportionate. Many killings likely amounted to wilful killing, a war crime in the context of occupation. Israeli security forces frequently denied or delayed medical assistance for those shot. On 29 December 2023, a 15-year-old Palestinian boy who was throwing stones at soldiers inside a military watchtower in Al ‘Eizariya, east of Jerusalem, was shot twice from inside the watchtower by a soldier who, when the boy shouted for help, shot him twice more. The boy died shortly afterwards. The use of force in these circumstances appears unnecessary and, even if force were necessary, lethal force was disproportionate, rendering the killing unlawful. The shots fired at the boy after his initial injury raise serious concerns of extrajudicial execution.”

Paragraph 31:

“Israeli security forces intensified the use of air strikes, shoulder-fired missiles and shelling during a rising number of operations. OHCHR verified the killing of 172 Palestinians, including 27 children and 4 women, in 59 air strikes and of 25 others by shelling, with serious concerns of unlawful killings, including targeted killings and

extrajudicial executions, alongside wanton destruction of Palestinian homes and infrastructure and resulting forcible transfer.”

Paragraph 33:

“On 27 August 2024, Israel launched simultaneous operations in the Jenin, Tulkarm and Tubas governorates, the largest in decades, with the stated intention of thwarting “terrorism”. Over 10 days, Israeli security forces killed 37 Palestinians, 8 of them children, in raids involving air strikes, ground-to-ground missiles and live ammunition. In Jenin camp and the city of Jenin alone, Israel damaged at least 1,900 housing units and bulldozed approximately 70 per cent of roads, as well as water and sewerage infrastructure. One Israeli soldier was killed by an improvised explosive device. The high Palestinian death toll and extensive material destruction appear incompatible with the human rights standards applicable to such operations.”

Paragraph 34:

“On the evening of 3 October 2024, in the absence of clashes or confrontations and without warning, an air strike penetrated a three-storey residential building in a densely populated neighbourhood in Tulkarm refugee camp, probably using at least one GBU-39 bomb, according to OHCHR analysis. The strike killed 18 Palestinians, including three children and one woman. At least 12 of those killed were unarmed. Israel stated that it had killed a “ Hamas leader ” and other key “ terrorists ” planning imminent attacks against Israel, gathered in a cafe on the building’s ground floor. The use of heavy explosives in an air strike in such a context indicates the disregard of Israel for its obligations under international human rights law and the likely commission of unlawful killings.”

Paragraph 38:

“Israel expanded the practice of punitively demolishing the family homes of Palestinians accused of carrying out attacks against Israelis, often pending criminal proceedings. During the reporting period, the Israeli authorities punitively demolished 36 structures, forcibly displacing 158 Palestinians, including 55 children and 55 women. Such demolitions violate international law, including the prohibition of discrimination, as they are not implemented against non-Palestinians accused of similar crimes.”

Paragraph 39:

“Israeli authorities continued to undertake other practices potentially constituting collective punishment, including arbitrary mass detention of Palestinians, among them family members of “wanted” Palestinians; applying administrative measures to family members of alleged attackers; and withholding the bodies of 173 Palestinians.”

Paragraph 57:

“The ongoing lack of accountability measures for serious allegations of international law violations resulting from these structural obstacles has raised serious doubts about Israeli authorities’ willingness and ability to conduct genuine investigations, as required by international law.”

Paragraph 62:

“Israeli forces and Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups have committed violations of international humanitarian law in Gaza, in many cases amounting to war crimes and other gross violations and abuses of international human rights law. If committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population, further to a State or organizational policy, such acts may constitute crimes against humanity. If committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such, they may also constitute genocide.”

Paragraph 63:

“In the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, there was an intensification of Israeli measures against Palestinians, which, coupled with pervasive State support for or collaboration with settler violence, exacerbated the occupation’s stifling impact on Palestinians’ lives and livelihoods, while deepening the denial of their right to self-determination.”

Paragraph 64:

“The frequency with which violations have gone unpunished has normalized duty bearers’ egregious conduct. In Israel, the pervasive and long-standing lack of accountability and prevailing environment of impunity continued to enable international law violations, which escalated in the reporting period, with an unprecedented impact on the lives and rights of Palestinians.”

National Court - Netherlands

Oxfam Novib et al v The Netherlands

Court of Appeal of The Hague – February 2024

Export of F-35 components to Israel – Legal finding of “clear risk” of serious violations of IHL

In February 2024, the Court of Appeal in The Hague found that the export of F-35 fighter jet components, hosted in the Netherlands and destined for Israel, posed a “clear risk” that they would be used to commit serious violations of international humanitarian law (IHL)—that is, war crimes. The court ordered the Dutch State to halt the export of these parts. The decision is currently under appeal before the Supreme Court.

Key excerpts from the decision include:

Paragraph 5.13:

“It is correct in itself that a definitive legal judgment cannot be derived from these sources on the question of whether Israel has violated international humanitarian law, but that is not necessary either. After all, the issue in these summary proceedings is whether there is a ‘clear risk’ of such violations.”

Paragraph 5.16:

“The court concludes that there are many indications that Israel has violated the humanitarian law of war in a considerable number of cases. It is correct in itself that a

definitive judicial decision on the question of whether the humanitarian law of war has indeed been violated in all these cases can only be made if a careful investigation of the facts has taken place, in which it has also been examined what information the commander who ordered the attack in question had and could have had. However, such a definitive decision is not necessary for a judgment on the 'clear risk'. The assessment of whether a clear risk exists relates to possible future use of the military goods to be delivered and this involves a certain degree of uncertainty. In estimating the likelihood of such future use, the conduct of the country of destination in the recent past will be significant, among other things. It cannot be required that conduct in the recent past could only play a role in estimating the clear risk if it has been definitively established that this conduct violated the humanitarian law of war. That would render the condition that it must be a 'clear risk' largely meaningless."

Paragraph 5.17:

"The facts show that large numbers of civilian casualties have been caused, including thousands of children, that thousands of homes have been destroyed, that 'dumb bombs' are being used, that any residential area is attacked if there is the slightest indication that terrorist activity is taking place, that previously applied limits with regard to 'collateral damage' have been extended in the current conflict, that the policy of warning civilians before an attack has been abandoned, that drinking water supplies, bakeries and a grain mill have been destroyed, that a hospital (the Al-Indonesi Hospital) has been bombed and that many of the hospitals in Gaza are no longer functioning. That this destruction has been inflicted exclusively on military targets or concerns legitimate 'collateral damage' is not plausible, not only in view of its unprecedented scale but also in view of the statements of Israeli soldiers themselves. On the basis of the foregoing, the court also concludes that the violations of international humanitarian law for which there is a clear risk are 'serious'."

NGOs Reports

Human Rights Watch

Extermination and Acts of Genocide: Israel Deliberately Depriving Palestinians in Gaza *December 2024, pp. 28–29*

"Human Rights Watch concludes that Israeli authorities have over the past year intentionally inflicted on the Palestinian population in Gaza 'conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.' This policy, inflicted as part of a mass killing of Palestinian civilians in Gaza means Israeli authorities have committed the crime against humanity of extermination, which is ongoing. This policy also amounts to an 'act of genocide' under the Genocide Convention of 1948.

The crime of genocide requires acts of genocide to be committed with genocidal intent. The ICJ has said that to infer such intent from a pattern of conduct by the state, it needs to be 'the only reasonable inference to be drawn' from the acts in question. The pattern of conduct set out in this report together with statements suggesting some Israeli officials wished to destroy the Palestinians in Gaza may indicate such intent."

Human Rights Watch

Report on Israel and Palestine – January 2024

“Israeli authorities’ repression of Palestinians, undertaken as part of a policy to maintain the domination of Jewish Israelis over Palestinians, amount to the crimes against humanity of apartheid and persecution.”

Amnesty International

The State of the World's Human Rights – April 2024

“Following 7 October, Israeli authorities increased restrictions on freedom of movement across the occupied West Bank. Israeli authorities deepened the apartheid system oppressing Palestinians in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, by implementing laws and policies of segregation, deprivation and forced displacement. In Gaza alone, 1.9 million Palestinians were forcibly displaced due to Israeli offensives, out of a population of 2.2 million. State-backed settler violence increased. In the Negev/Naqab in southern Israel, Israeli forces continued to demolish Bedouin homes and whole villages, including one village for the 222nd time. In the West Bank, Israeli policing operations were the most lethal since 2005, with 110 Palestinian children among those killed. Detentions of Palestinians without charge or trial reached record levels. Inside Israel, police sometimes used excessive force and arbitrary arrests at anti-government demonstrations, and imposed bans on anti-war protests in Palestinian communities.”

To: 5.1 lid 2 e

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EXTRACT from DECISIONS CONFIDENTIAL CONSIDERATION EXECUTIVE BOARD

- Meeting on 03/06/2025

When the undermentioned gives cause for making comments, a request for an explanation from and/or a conversation with the Executive Board, please turn to the office of the Executive Board (Griffie CvB).

Re: 5. HRDD Phase 1 Assessment Report: Israel/Palestine; CvB-besluit
- email voorzitter Commissie met bijlage, 31 mei 2025

Het CvB neemt kennis van het rapport van de Human Rights Advisory Committee over de afronding van fase 1 (Israel/Palestina). De Commissie heeft geoordeeld dat er voldoende aanleiding is om te vervolgen met fase 2 (beoordeling partners). Met betrekking tot de opmerking van de Commissie in het voorwoord "this decision does not set a precedent for all future cases, which may be addressed through a single, consolidated report covering both phases", verzoekt het CvB de Commissie om het CvB altijd te informeren als de Commissie fase 1 afgerond heeft en verder gaat met fase 2.

Definition of an institutional strategic partnership

New working definition:

An institutional strategic partnership (ISP) is ~~one a partnership between two or more institutions~~ that goes beyond a one-off ~~research~~ collaboration to include long-term partnership, whether at the departmental, institute, faculty or university level. Such partnerships often involve contracts, but contracts are neither necessary nor sufficient to constitute an ISP. ISPs can also include consultancy.

1. Modified original definition

"An institutional strategic partnership is a partnership ~~one~~ where the Executive Board or Faculty Board needs to agree upon a partnership that transcends individual collaborative activities between academics, often including ~~includes~~ strategic university and/or faculty strategic objectives and that is formalised through a contract signed by a member of the Executive Board or Faculty Board." ~~"This tends to exclude collaborations on the departmental, institute, researcher-researcher or research group level. However, in cases of doubt, partnerships are included for further analysis by HRAC."~~

Institutional is defined as concerning a higher education institution, eg a university or faculty - not department or research institute level. Strategic partnerships are those that implement strategy over the long term.

In a case where there is uncertainty whether a partnership should be considered institutional strategic partnerships or not, such partnerships are included for further analysis by the HRAC.

Source: By "international strategic institutional partnerships" we mean any long-term collaboration of a higher education institution with one or more partner organisations in another country that goes beyond a specific project or a student exchange programme."

https://www.eua.eu/images/eua_international_partnerships_survey.pdf

Full old definition from partnership file:

An institutional strategic partnership is a partnership where the Executive Board or Faculty Board needs to agree upon the partnership that transcends individual collaborative activities between academics, often including strategic university and/or faculty strategic objectives and that is formalised through a contract signed by the Executive Board or Faculty Board.

It may include:

- Formalised UM-wide participation in academic networks
- Faculty-to-faculty partnerships
- Commercial partnerships
- Partnerships on student and staff exchange

Individual activities between academics include:

- one-to-one joint research projects
- joint publications
- an individual guest lecture
- and individual consultancies

Deel I: Toetsingskader Internationale Samenwerking¹

Checklist met vragen om in te vullen indien samenwerking wordt beoogd met een buitenlandse partner.

UM	
UM-brede samenwerking?	☐ Ja ☒ Nee
Faculteit	Choose an item.
Instituut/afdeling (indien van toepassing)	MUMC+ Oogheelkunde

Beoogde buitenlandse partner	
Instelling	Shaare Zedek Medical Center
Faculteit/instituut/afdeling (indien van toepassing)	Department of Ophthalmology
Land	Israël

A. Wat is het doel van de samenwerking?
☐ Onderwijs algemeen ☐ Student exchange ☐ Co-schappen ☐ Double degree ☐ Onderwijsontwikkeling ☒ Onderzoek algemeen ☐ Onderzoekssamenwerking binnen Europese subsidie ☐ Onderzoekssamenwerking met andere buitenlandse subsidie/financiering ☐ Onderzoeksopdracht van buitenlands bedrijf ☐ Joint doctorate ☐ Breed partnerschap ☐ Organisatie congres ☐ Anders, namelijk.....

B. Wat is de beoogde vorm van samenwerking?
☐ Subsidiecontract ☒ Samenwerkingsovereenkomst ☐ Raamovereenkomst ☐ Service Level agreement (SLA) ☐ Consortiumovereenkomst ☐ Anders, namelijk.....
Toelichting

¹ Nadere toelichting bij de vragen is te vinden in het *Toetsingskader Internationale Samenwerking en Kennisveiligheid (TISK)*.

C. Wat zijn de beoogde resultaten ('deliverables') van de samenwerking?

5.1 lid 2 f

D. Wat is de motivatie voor samenwerking met deze partner(s)?

- ☐ Met deze partner werken we al samen. Contract betreft verlenging van reeds bestaande samenwerking
- ☒ Met deze partner werken we al samen. Samenwerking betreft echter nieuwe activiteit
- ☐ Betreft nieuwe partner met goed trackrecord
- ☐ Onderwijs algemeen
- ☐ Onderwijs algemeen

E. Wat is de toegevoegde waarde van de samenwerking voor de UM?

Data aangeleverd door de afdeling Oogheelkunde van het Shaare Zedek Medical Center wordt gebruikt in onze klinische studie. Er moeten 200 patiënten in de studie worden geïnccludeerd, wij denken dat een significant aantal hiervan in het Shaare Zedek kan worden geïnccludeerd.

F. Wat is de toegevoegde waarde van de samenwerking voor de beoogde partner(s)?

Meedoen met multicenter onderzoek, een bijdrage leveren aan de wetenschap.

G. Welke formele aspecten zijn aan de samenwerking verbonden die enige vorm van een schriftelijke overeenkomst noodzakelijk maken?

- ☐ Er wordt background kennis ingebracht
- ☒ Er worden afspraken over Intellectual Property gemaakt
- ☐ Onderwijs algemeen
- ☒ De UM investeert in de samenwerking d.m.v. het inzetten van personeel en/of infrastructuur
- ☐ De UM ontvangt een financiële bijdrage van de partnerorganisatie

H. Welke financiële implicaties/verplichtingen zijn verbonden aan de samenwerking?

Financiële vergoeding voor het deelnemende centrum in Israël per geïnccludeerde studiepatiënt. Dit om de extra kosten te dekken voor de extra studievizite en handelingen.

I. Welke risico's zijn verbonden aan de samenwerking? Op welke manier(en) kunnen deze worden gemitigeerd?

Er zijn geen risico's verbonden aan de samenwerking. Technieken die worden gebruikt zijn reeds algemeen bekend. Data wordt van Israël met Maastricht gedeeld, niet van Maastricht naar Israël. Financiële vergoeding is gebaseerd op extra kosten die worden gemaakt door het Shaare Zedek Medical Center bij studiepatiënten.

J. Is samenwerking met deze partner toegestaan/wenselijk?

Samenwerking met deze partner is toegestaan en wenselijk. Er worden patiënten in studieverband geopereerd aan staar, de geopereerde patiënten verwachten wij een betere visus te kunnen geven. Samenwerking blijft beperkt tot de Afdeling Oogheelkunde van het Shaare Zedek Medical Center.

Indien uit de antwoorden op bovenstaande vragen blijkt dat er risico's op het gebied van Kennisveiligheid verbonden zijn aan de beoogde samenwerking en/of er twijfels bestaan of de beoogde samenwerking wel toegestaan/wenselijk is, dan dienen de vragen in **Deel II. Toetsingskader Kennisveiligheid** te worden ingevuld.

Part II: Knowledge Security Assessment Framework¹

Applicant	5.1 lid 2 e
Faculty	FHML
Partner(s)	Department of Ophthalmology at Shaare Zedek Medical Center (Israel)
Date of request	19 June 2025
Request description	Cooperation agreement on data sharing <u>from</u> Shaare Zedek Medical Centre in Israel <u>to</u> FHML/MUMC+ Ophthalmology Department
Conclusion & advice	Advice: Conditionally positive (5.1 lid 2 e) (see conditions highlighted in yellow below) Summary: There are no entities involved that appear on the EU Sanctions List (section A). The agreement concerns (and is confined to) a transaction of data, from the Medical Center, to UM/MUMC+. This does not involve data related to dual-use technologies (section C). The data is purely medical in nature and not controversial or politically sensitive. There are various military connections to be noted. Late 2023, Shaare Zedek Medical Center and Arieli Capital jointly started the SHAAR Innovation Hub to support startups in healthcare and other sectors, with backing from the Jerusalem Development Authority. However, Arieli Capital's ties to defense (focused) investments and projects, amongst others through entities like Elron Ventures (which holds a joint investment model with Rafael Advanced Defense Systems), this raises concerns about possible military interests being linked to the medical center, though SHAAR's official stance on this remains unclear due to limited public information (section D). In the proposed partnership, it is intended that the financial contribution from the UM will cover the patient data costs per included study patient. Condition: It is strongly advised to include a statement in the contract stating that the financial compensation must go to the department for which it is intended, and used for the intended purpose (section E). Addition: it has been communicated that financial compensation can only occur and be offered for factually made operational costs. This secures correct usage of financial transactions. Besides the military connections, which can lead to ethical concerns, the Medical Center is, according to the Dutch branch of the Center, profoundly pro-life (that is: anti-abortion), which, in the light of the initiative by the European Parliament to include the right of abortion in the EU Fundamental Rights chapter, can become an issue of concern. In the current political landscape, collaboration with Israeli entities can cause ethical and moral dilemmas. Seen the signs of military interests of the Medical Center, it is advised to not extent the collaboration beyond

¹ Nadere toelichting bij de vragen is te vinden in het *Toetsingskader Internationale Samenwerking en Kennisveiligheid (TISK)*.

this agreement (of financial compensation in exchange for patient data) without contacting the SPU for further advice.

Step 1 – Legal Framework

A. SANCTIONS LIST:

Are the prospective employee, and/or relevant contacts of the prospective candidate, and/or the institute/organisation where the candidate has worked and/or studied, as stated on the CV, included on the EU Sanctions List?

Are the intended partner organisation, their concern relations, and/or persons from the board included on the EU Sanctions List?

[Click here for the EU Sanctions List](#) → Proceed to click on 'consolidated list of financial sanctions' and download the list.

Why do we ask this?

Collaborating with institutes and/or persons listed on the EU Sanctions List is prohibited by law. Establishing a collaboration with a sanctioned entity leads to violation of the sanctions law, which constitutes an economic offence.

The Israeli partner involved, Shaare Zedek Medical Center, is not listed on the EU sanctions list.

The Shaare Zedek Medical Center is directly affiliated with Hebrew University of Jerusalem. This institution is also not listed on the EU sanctions list.

Shaare Zedek Medical Center has various subsidiaries for fundraising in different other countries other than Israel. For example: USA, UK, Australia, Canada, Mexico, The Netherlands and Switzerland.

The main website of Shaare Zedek Medical Center is not accessible, possibly because of Israeli restrictions, below the error:

szmc.org.il | Access denied (403)

Current session has been terminated.

For further information, do not hesitate to contact us.

Ref: 137.120.210.248 2025-07-08T12:40:37.342Z

Due to the lack of access to the centre's official webpage, most information is dependent on other sources reporting it or sharing it. After a Google search, we found three names for the chairs of the Israeli branch:

5.1 lid 2 e

All three of them are not on the EU sanctions list. Same for the other board members, including members of the US and UK branches.

The Shaare Zedek Medical Center has developed a Hub with Elron Ventures (who has a defence portfolio) see also section D). We checked the Board of Elron Ventures and none of the board members appear on the EU sanctions list.

5.1 lid 2 e

B. HEIGHTENED SUPERVISION:

Is the field of research or education to which the candidate or project will contribute to subject to heightened governmental supervision?

Areas of heightened supervision concern technical research and education that contributes to the development of highly sensitive knowledge. **UM currently does not have any fields of research that are subject to heightened supervision**, but this can change in the future. For more information, see the governmental webpage [Kennisembargo](#) (in Dutch).

Why do we ask this?

Certain research and education in the Netherlands brings forth knowledge with which nuclear weapons, weapons of mass destruction or relevant means of transmission can be produced or developed. Therefore, anyone who can obtain access to such sensitive knowledge (e.g. students, researchers and technical staff) must apply for a licence before starting with the research project or education. Without licence, it is not possible to start a course or research project, or access to these (specialist) areas will be denied.

UM currently does not have any fields of research that are subject to heightened governmental supervision.

C. DUAL USE / EXPORT CONTROLS:

Is the subject of research, in which the prospective candidate or to which the project will contribute, subject to Dual Use or Export controls?

Do the research or education activities use or produce knowledge about technological sensitive items (strategic goods), or are such technologically sensitive items produced within the intended collaboration? If so, one may likely need an export licence.

The Dutch [export control policies](#) follow international (European or other international) arrangements and regulations. **All higher education and research institutes need to comply with the following four (4) elements of the multilateral export regulations:**

- The [Wassenaar Arrangement](#), concerning export controls for conventional weapons and sensitive items and technologies for dual use purpose;
- The [Australia Group](#) (AG) for biological and chemical weapons;
- The [Nuclear Suppliers Group](#) (NSG), concerning export controls for nuclear materials, equipment and technologies for dual use purpose;
- The [Missile Technology Control Regime](#) (MTCR), which follows the EU-Iran 212/2012 sanctions. These sanctions have lead to mandatory screening of staff and students in certain fields of research.

Areas of research that previously have been subjected to export controls for dual use items can be found in Annex 1 of the [EU recommendations concerning dual use](#).

More information about export controls can be found on the website of the Dutch [RVO](#).

[Information about how to apply for an export licence can be found here](#) (in Dutch).

Why do we ask this?

Strategic goods (i.e. military, dual use or sanctioned goods) risk to be used for undesired (wrongful) purposes. Mandatory licencing for the export of strategic goods and related services has been introduced as a means to avoid such undesired application. If the risk of undesired (wrongful) application is deemed too high, a licence may not be issued. If controlled goods are exported without licence, this violates EU regulations. Economic crimes are punished under the Economic Offences Act (2021).

The proposed partnership entails a data exchange with patient data from the Shaare Zedek Medical Center to the MUMC Ophthalmology department for their clinical study. The partnership is limited to the Ophthalmology Department of the Shaare Zedek Medical Center.

The proposed project only entails the exchange of patient data from Israel to the Netherlands and not the other way around. Because of this, no knowledge from the UM is shared with the partner but rather the partner shares data with UM. The partner in Israel does not seem to have an immediate gain other than the financial compensation for sharing the patient data for the clinical study at UM.

Since the subject of the project only concerns using patient data sent from Israel to UM, this does not fall under dual-use or export controls. buiten scope, 5.1 lid 2 f

By financing the patient data, the UM will not directly contribute to the development of dual-use technology systems.

Step 2 – Risk Management

D. MILITARY RELATIONS:

Is the institute/organisation at which the prospective employee has studied and/or worked, or with which the collaboration is intended to be realised, affiliated with a military organisation outside of the EU?

If the institute/organisation is based in China, one can do a first military relations check on the website of the [Australian Strategic Policy Institute \(ASPI Unitracker\)](#). This website contains a list of 52 Chinese universities with military ties to the Chinese army and qualifies universities based on their risk level, including the National University of Defence Technology (NUDT). Also listed are the so-called '7 Sons Universities': the national and public Chinese research universities that operate in the interests of the Chinese Ministry of Industry and Information Technology. It is generally acknowledged that these universities have close ties and intensively collaborate with the Chinese army.

The '7 Sons Universities' are:

1. Beihang University in Haidan, Beijing
2. Beijing Institute of Technology in Haidan, Beijing
3. Harbin Engineering University in Harbin, Heilongjiang
4. Harbin Institute of Technology in Harbin, Heilongjiang
5. Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics in Nanjing, Jiangsu
6. Nanjing University of Science and Technology in Nanjing, Jiangsu
7. Northwestern Polytechnical University in Xi'an, Shaanxi

The ASPI list has 4 risk level qualifications. UM has a general line of advice for each level:

Very High risk	Collaboration is undesired
High risk	Avoid dual use research, even if no (export) permits are needed
Medium Risk	Avoid collaborations with defence-related departments
Low Risk	Avoid sensitive research areas

Why do we ask this?

Collaborating with military organisations outside of the EU poses considerable risks, such as the risk of undesired (wrongful) application of goods and technologies, and are therefore considered undesired. Moreover, all export to military end-users in countries that are subject to a [weapon embargo](#) (click on the menu → Measures → Cross check "arms embargo") are in need of an export licence.

Concerning China: UM generally does not allow collaborations with the '7 Sons Universities' mentioned above. If it is desired to establish a collaboration with a military organisation, the Knowledge Security office will have to present the case to the Executive Board (CvB).

Shaare Zedek Medical Center, as mentioned in section A, is directly affiliated with Hebrew University (in order to promote medical education and scientific advancement). Sources mention that Shaare Zedek Medical Center serves as a teaching hospital for the Hebrew University's Faculty of Medicine. We could not seem to find more information on exchange programmes, residencies, or military specialisation tracks at Shaare Zedek Medical Center.

According to online sources, Shaare Zedek's physicians also play key roles with Israel Defense Forces' Field Hospital that have been dispatched all over the world to provide urgent medical assistance and relief when disasters strike. Here are several examples of IDF and Shaare Zedek's physicians working together. The sources are relatively dated however they seem to be spread in time, showing a long term affiliation.

Shaare Zedek Medical Center physicians hold military (medical) rankings in the IDF; for example 5.1 lid 2 e is a Colonel in the Reserves and the Commander of the I.D.F. Field Hospital.

At the end of 2023, Shaare Zedek Medical Center and investment firm Arieli Capital have announced the creation of the Shaare Zedek Arieli Innovation Hub, SHAAR. This centre was launched with the support of the Jerusalem Development Authority and is located within the Shaare Zedek Medical Center.

- *The hub facilitates advanced innovation programs and access to investment and funding opportunities, providing startups and medical projects with the resources needed (available here).*
- Defence systems are within the portfolio of Arieli Capital; the Arieli website reports on several majority shares acquisitions (as recent as 2024) of companies working on defence systems, one of which is Elron Ventures (as reported here).
- Elron Ventures holds a joint investment model with Rafael Advanced Defense Systems. Elron and Rafael are both prominent entities in the Israeli defense industry, though they operate in distinct capacities. Rafael Advanced Defense Systems is a major developer and manufacturer of advanced defense systems, while Elron Electronic Industries is a holding company with investments in various technology sectors, including a significant stake in Rafael's commercialization arm, RDC (Rafael Development Corporation).
- 5.1 lid 2 e of Elron Ventures mentioned in June 2025 "As the distinction between civilian and defense technologies blurs, this is an applicable, stable and well-established model to support startups that operate at the intersection of innovation and operational need". This finding links Elron directly to dual-use technology.
- 5.1 lid 2 e at Arieli Group, also widely advertises the unique opportunity of investments in dual-use technology portfolios via a recent (March 2025) Forbs article. "With substantial government contracts on the table and the potential for these technologies to be adapted for commercial markets, I believe we can expect to see venture capitalist firms doubling down on their dual-use investment portfolios." The managing partner also mentions that dual use technologies bring great opportunities in various fields, including health: "Opportunities Ahead VCs have numerous opportunities to capitalize on dual-use technology investments across diverse sectors like healthcare, agritech and the automotive industry."
- Via the SHAAR innovation hub, the Shaare Zedek Medical Center also shows a military interest and is potentially facilitating military structures. Financially contributing to a hub which is partly showing great military interest is a sensitive development. Because

of the restricted access to the Shaare Zedek Medical Center's website, it is not possible for us to check whether the center also aligns with these ambitions, and if they actively communicate about that (or deny such involvement).

E. FINANCES/FUNDING:

Does the prospective employee/candidate or project receive funding from a non-Dutch funding agency? If so, from which funding agency?

If not, what other source of funding is used to finance the position/project? Are there any additional conditions or financial interests attached to these funds?

If the prospective employee/candidate receives funding from an organisation under authoritarian control, or if the intended partner organisation is located in an area under authoritarian control, one can check the [Democracy Index](#) rating of that particular area/country. In case the intended collaboration involves entities from countries that score between 0-4 (colour code red-orange), it is necessary to motivate the surplus value as opposed to the risks (e.g. covert influence) towards one's dean.

With regard to China, UM's general policy on China Scholarship Council (CSC) scholarships is as follows:

- No CSC scholarship students in sensitive research areas (see section F);
- No CSC scholarship students from NUDT, the 52 military universities or the 7 Sons Universities (see section D);
- **Accepting:** incoming CSC scholarship students, selected by UM, on UM-based subjects, with PhD supervision in Maastricht. Co-supervision from China is possible, provided that the supervisor and second supervisor from UM are involved in the project;
- Incoming CSC scholarship students for 1 or 2 years with supervision from China will need to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. An important precondition for such collaborations is reciprocity.

Why do we ask this?

Allowing researchers (scholarship students) to work on projects in which sensitive technology is used or developed poses risks. This applies mainly to researchers originating from areas under authoritarian control. These areas/countries often also receive a low score on the [Academic Freedom Index](#). Consequently, there is a risk of covert influence (e.g. by state actors), which can compromise **academic freedom and scientific integrity**.

The source of funding has a direct impact on the security, control and ethical application of knowledge. It determines who has access to, control over, or can use certain knowledge and technology. This has implications for the protection of strategic, economic and possibly also national interests. Therefore, it is essential that funders/funding sources are carefully assessed in terms of reliability, transparency and strategic interests, in order to safeguard knowledge security and to minimise risks such as undesired or covert influence.

Shaare Zedek Medical Center is a private-public partnership that receives funding from both government and private sources, with a significant reliance on donations for research, equipment upgrades, and expansion. Several organisations outside Israel raise funds for the Shaare Zedek Medical Center; as far as known to us: [Australian Friends of Shaare Zedek](#), [Shaare Zedek UK](#), [The Canadian Shaare Zedek Hospital Foundation](#), [The American Committee for Shaare Zedek Medical Center](#), [Shaare Zedek Foundation Netherlands](#), [Friends of Shaare Zedek Mexico](#),

The partner receives public funding from the government of Israel; this is declared in various annual reports (e.g. UK branch). One such example from the UK is available [here](#).

In the proposed project, the UM would pay for the patient data (the UM provides the funding) and we determine the conditions for the funding. Nevertheless, the financial conditions on which the Shaare Zedek

Medical Center is dependent on funding from other streams too (which we cannot trace back, nor check if there were any conditions tied to the donations).

Seen the possibly ethically questionable ties to the defence industry via investment companies (see section D) that the medical center has, it is important to make sure that the financial compensation for the data is indeed used for the intended purpose. That is: In the proposed partnership, it is intended that the financial contribution from the UM will cover the patient data costs per included study patient. This is to cover additional costs for the extra study visit and operations. It is highly advised to include a statement in the contract stating that the financial compensation must go to the department for which it is intended, and used for the intended purpose.

F. SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGIES:

Does the subject of research in which the prospective employee/external PhD candidate/visiting researcher is active, or to which the project will contribute to, fall under the category of 'sensitive technologies' and does the collaboration involve a partner from a high-risk area/country?

The combination of sensitive technology and collaboration with an entity from a high-risk area is, in principle, not permitted at UM.

Sensitive technologies, also referred to as 'high risk research areas', include technologies that the Dutch government considers to have specific military, economic and/or geopolitical strategic values.

The following research areas may involve technologies that can be considered sensitive:

<i>Dual Use Technologies</i>	<i>Key Technologies</i>	<i>Emerging Technologies</i>
• High performance computing • Quantum computing • Artificial Intelligence (AI) • Advanced data analytics • Simulation technology • Cybertechnology • Advanced materials • Biotechnology/Life sciences • Nanotechnology • Optica/photonics (ET) • Robotics & autonomous systems • Sensing technologies • Logistics (infrastructure)	• Advanced materials • Chemical technology • Digital technology (incl. AI) • Life science technology • Regenerative medicine	• Artificial Intelligence (AI) • Biotechnology • Blockchain • Smart materials • Sensing technology • (Molecular) imaging

Why do we ask this?

In order to effectively minimise risks, it is necessary to identify sensitive research domains. Sensitive technologies oftentimes have specific strategic, economic or military purposes and values. Knowledge Security policies aim to protect sensitive knowledge from undesired access, espionage, theft or uncontrolled distribution, in order to safeguard national security, our economic competitiveness, and societal stability.

The subject of the partnership does not directly involve sensitive technologies. It only refers to patient data. As shown in section C and D, partners associated with Shaare Zedek Medical Center via the hub, are funded for the development of defence technology with direct and explicit dual use (civilian – military). Since the project is not involved in developing knowledge or technology for dual use itself, we can assume that this partnership will not contribute to sensitive use especially because the data is shared with the UM and not

the other way around.

G. ETHICAL AND MORAL DILEMMAS:

Are there any (other) ethical or moral dilemmas associated with hiring the prospective candidate or the intended collaboration with the prospective person/organisation?

We must be particularly attentive when collaborating with partners from areas in which fundamental rights are not (always) respected. Examples of ethical or moral dilemmas include violations of human rights or academic values, when the safety of researchers cannot be guaranteed, when there is a risk of oppression or coercion, when knowledge may be misused (wrongful purpose), or when there is a risk of unintended transfer of knowledge (diversion). Also covert influence and interference activities that can lead to (self-)censorship, and thus may undermine academic freedom, can be considered.

Why do we ask this?

The core values of 'academic freedom' and 'scientific integrity' are paramount to UM. When these core values risk to be compromised as a result of an international collaboration, caution is needed. Risk factors include the possibility of pressure and coercion through (state) interference or covert influence.

Moreover, it is highly undesirable to contribute to human rights violations anywhere in the world. **If there are suspicions that a project or partner may contribute to the violation of human rights, please consult the Human Rights Due Diligence Framework (HRDD).**

UM also does not want to collaborate with partners that hinder the transition towards a fossil-free, climate neutral society. **For collaborations with entities that are active within the fossil-fuel industry, please consult the Fossil-free Society assessment framework.**

The medical centre is widely known internationally as a centre for advancement of medical research. New reports show that the hospital has a on standing tradition in sending its doctors to IDF field hospitals outside Israel. Although this shows that the skills and expertise of the doctors is highly sought, it also shows that the hospital and direct doctors employed at the hospital have a strong connection with IDF. Given the recent developments of IDF in 2025, this might be seen as involvement from the Shaare Zedek Medical Center in furthering the work of IDF.

News outlets have widely shared that the Israeli prime-minister Benjamin Netanyahu was treated at the Shaare Zedek Medical Center in May 2025. This poses an ethical dilemma and a high public view concern since this links the hospital directly to the prime-minister who leads Israel's military actions.

Media sources report on various events which cause reasons for ethical concerns; at the same time contradictory reports are also available. For example, a news report shows that doctors at this hospital have in the past treated patients linked to Hamas. At the same time, a source also shows that in 2022 the IDF brought a Palestinian teenager at the Shaare Zedek Medical Center and escorted him through hospital while handcuffed and blindfolded for a what was probably a forced medical test. This raises various concerns, including ethical and moral ones on the side of the hospital for having performed a medical test on a person who was forcefully brought to the hospital by the IDF. In contrast with this event, news reports from 2023 report that a police officer used a teaser on a suspect who was accused of planning a stabbing attack. This prompted doctors at the hospital refusing to discharge the patient until other cops took over the person.

The website of the Dutch medical foundation mentions "A key reason for the hospital's involvement lies in its pro-life status, which guarantees the protection of life: abortion and euthanasia are rejected on Biblical grounds. Based on the Torah, the hospital will not relinquish this identity. Government interference in this area is prohibited, meaning it receives little to no government support. As a result, the hospital is heavily dependent on donations, largely provided by eight Jewish organizations worldwide". The hospital is therefore pro-life which can be seen as an ethical concern seen that the European Parliament has initiated to include the right of abortion in the EU Fundamental Rights chapter. Sources report on this initiative. This shows that EU-wide, there is a concern towards banning abortion rights.

H. SENSITIVE (PERSONAL) DATA:

Does the intended collaboration or project make use of, or produce personal data or technologically sensitive data (see also section F)?

If so: has there already been drafted a Data Management Plan (DMP)?

According to UM's Open Science policy (2022-2026), UM strives to make Open Sciences practices the norm, using the credo "as open as possible, as closed as necessary". This ambition may induce some knowledge security risks. An important aspect of knowledge security concerns the risk of leakage of data, information or knowledge, in any form possible. Most research involves the usage of, or creation of data. **In most occasions, it is therefore necessary or desired to draft a Data Management Plan (DMP), which describes how data can be collected, stored and shared safely, following GDPR guidelines. For more information, consult this [link](#).**

Why do we ask this?

When using or creating (research) data, the data may be subject to privacy (GDPR) laws. In some cases, there may be patentable knowledge involved.

When collaborating with a foreign organisation/entity or when hiring staff from high-risk areas, there is a risk of covert influence. Besides that this can lead to data security issues, it can negatively impact the quality of the data. Therefore, a robust approach, in which technological safety measures go hand in hand with legal regulation and ethical awareness, is of crucial importance for safeguarding knowledge security. In this way, technological progress can be achieved, while simultaneously guaranteeing the security of sensitive knowledge.

The intended project will make use of patient personal data, however the data is shared with the UM by the partner and not the other way around. The project will include agreements on the management of the data.

Part II: Knowledge Security Assessment Framework¹

Applicant	5.1 lid 2 e
Faculty	BU/JZ
Partner(s)	Hadassah Medical Organization (in consortium)
Date of request	23/06/2025
Request description	Advice on consortium agreement with Israeli partner involved (EU BETTER, Clinical Data Science)
Conclusion & advice	Advice: Positive 5.1 lid 2 e 08/07/2025) Summary: There are no records of affiliated entities on the EU Sanctions list (section A). The subject of research is not sensitive (section F) and not subject to dual use or export controls (section C). The funding comes from the EU, and therefore, the conditions are known, lowering the risk of undesired interference (section E). The biggest risk in this collaboration relates to ethical concerns: Hadassah Medical Organization is directly affiliated with Hebrew University, through the Hadassah Medical School, and two joint hospitals: Eim Kerem and Mount Scopus. The Medical School offers the Tzameret programme, which is a programme in Research in Military Medicine, offered jointly with the IDF (Israeli Defence Force). The Tzameret programme (and thus the Hadassah Medical School) thus facilitates the military structures. Indirectly, the organisation (which is the partner in the proposed consortium) is affiliated with the IDF in their facilitation of the military medical programme. Looking at the contract, no names are mentioned. However, looking further into the project itself and the subject of research, it becomes clear that most (if not all) of the researchers involved from Israel, are affiliated with the Division of Ophtamology, at the Medical Center. There are no immediate signs of direct relations between the Division of Ophtalmology the Institute for Research in Military Medicine, other than being part of the same faculty. Therefore, while the Hadassah Organization as a whole does facilitate military structures, the scientists involved are affiliated with a department that does not have immediate connections to these military structures (as far as we can see). (See section D) Entering a collaboration with a partner that could be seen as complicit in the ongoing crimes against the Palestinian people due to their involvement in military (medical) training, even though the involved scientists themselves are not directly involved in these practices may lead to ethical issues, such as the risk of reputational damage. Especially also due to the location and unresolved disputes around the location of the hospital on Mount Scopus, caution is advised. (See section G).

¹ Nadere toelichting bij de vragen is te vinden in het *Toetsingskader Internationale Samenwerking en Kennisveiligheid (TISK)*.

Step 1 – Legal Framework

A. SANCTIONS LIST:

Are the prospective employee, and/or relevant contacts of the prospective candidate, and/or the institute/organisation where the candidate has worked and/or studied, as stated on the CV, included on the EU Sanctions List?

Are the intended partner organisation, their concern relations, and/or persons from the board included on the EU Sanctions List?

[Click here for the EU Sanctions List](#) → Proceed to click on 'consolidated list of financial sanctions' and download the list.

Why do we ask this?

Collaborating with institutes and/or persons listed on the EU Sanctions List is prohibited by law. Establishing a collaboration with a sanctioned entity leads to violation of the sanctions law, which constitutes an economic offence.

The Israeli partner involved, Hadassah Medical Organization, is not listed on the EU sanctions list.

Hadassah Medical Organization is directly affiliated with Hebrew University of Jerusalem. This institution is not listed on the EU sanctions list either.

The [management at Hadassah Medical Organization](#) has been checked. None of these names have been found on the EU sanctions list.

5.1 lid 2 e

B. HEIGHTENED SUPERVISION:

Is the field of research or education to which the candidate or project will contribute to subject to heightened governmental supervision?

Areas of heightened supervision concern technical research and education that contributes to the development of highly sensitive knowledge. **UM currently does not have any fields of research that are subject to heightened supervision**, but this can change in the future. For more information, see the governmental webpage [Kennisembargo](#) (in Dutch).

Why do we ask this?

Certain research and education in the Netherlands brings forth knowledge with which nuclear weapons, weapons of mass destruction or relevant means of transmission can be produced or developed. Therefore, anyone who can obtain access to such sensitive knowledge (e.g. students, researchers and technical staff) must apply for a licence before starting with the research project or education. Without licence, it is not possible to start a course or research project, or access to these (specialist) areas will be denied.

UM currently does not have any fields of research that are subject to heightened governmental supervision.

C. DUAL USE / EXPORT CONTROLS:

Is the subject of research, in which the prospective candidate or to which the project will contribute, subject to Dual Use or Export controls?

Do the research or education activities use or produce knowledge about technological sensitive items (strategic goods), or are such technologically sensitive items produced within the intended collaboration? If so, one may likely need an export licence.

The Dutch [export control policies](#) follow international (European or other international) arrangements and regulations. **All higher education and research institutes need to comply with the following four (4) elements of the multilateral export regulations:**

- The [Wassenaar Arrangement](#), concerning export controls for conventional weapons and sensitive items and technologies for dual use purpose;
- The [Australia Group](#) (AG) for biological and chemical weapons;
- The [Nuclear Suppliers Group](#) (NSG), concerning export controls for nuclear materials, equipment and technologies for dual use purpose;
- The [Missile Technology Control Regime](#) (MTCR), which follows the EU-Iran 212/2012 sanctions. These sanctions have led to mandatory screening of staff and students in certain fields of research.

Areas of research that previously have been subjected to export controls for dual use items can be found in Annex 1 of the [EU recommendations concerning dual use](#).

More information about export controls can be found on the website of the Dutch [RVO](#).

[Information about how to apply for an export licence can be found here](#) (in Dutch).

Why do we ask this?

Strategic goods (i.e. military, dual use or sanctioned goods) risk to be used for undesired (wrongful) purposes. Mandatory licencing for the export of strategic goods and related services has been introduced as a means to avoid such undesired application. If the risk of undesired (wrongful) application is deemed too high, a licence may not be issued. If controlled goods are exported without licence, this violates EU regulations. Economic crimes are punished under the Economic Offences Act (2021).

The consortium's project concerns using patient data to improve analysis methods and routines related to this data. This does not fall under dual-use or export controls.

D. MILITARY RELATIONS:

Is the institute/organisation at which the prospective employee has studied and/or worked, or with which the collaboration is intended to be realised, affiliated with a military organisation outside of the EU?

If the institute/organisation is based in China, one can do a first military relations check on the website of the [Australian Strategic Policy Institute \(ASPI Unitracker\)](#). This website contains a list of 52 Chinese universities with military ties to the Chinese army and qualifies universities based on their risk level, including the National University of Defence Technology (NUDT). Also listed are the so-called '7 Sons Universities': the national and public Chinese research universities that operate in the interests of the Chinese Ministry of Industry and Information Technology. It is generally acknowledged that these universities have close ties and intensively collaborate with the Chinese army.

The '7 Sons Universities' are:

1. Beihang University in Haidan, Beijing
2. Beijing Institute of Technology in Haidan, Beijing
3. Harbin Engineering University in Harbin, Heilongjiang
4. Harbin Institute of Technology in Harbin, Heilongjiang
5. Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics in Nanjing, Jiangsu
6. Nanjing University of Science and Technology in Nanjing, Jiangsu
7. Northwestern Polytechnical University in Xi'an, Shaanxi

The ASPI list has 4 risk level qualifications. UM has a general line of advice for each level:

Very High risk	Collaboration is undesired
High risk	Avoid dual use research, even if no (export) permits are needed
Medium Risk	Avoid collaborations with defence-related departments
Low Risk	Avoid sensitive research areas

Why do we ask this?

Collaborating with military organisations outside of the EU poses considerable risks, such as the risk of undesired (wrongful) application of goods and technologies, and are therefore considered undesired. Moreover, all export to military end-users in countries that are subject to a [weapon embargo](#) (click on the menu → Measures → Cross check "arms embargo") are in need of an export licence. Concerning China: UM generally does not allow collaborations with the '7 Sons Universities' mentioned above. If it is desired to establish a collaboration with a military organisation, the Knowledge Security office will have to present the case to the Executive Board (CvB).

Hadassah Medical Organization is, as mentioned in section A, directly [affiliated](#) with Hebrew University, through academic activities. The [Organization has two hospitals](#): Eim Kerem and Mount Scopus. [Jointly](#) with the Hebrew University, they run the Hadassah Medical School. They [share facilities](#) with each other and exchange scientists.

At first sight, there seem to be no immediate records to be found of Hadassah Medical Organization having clear ties to the (Israeli) military. [One article](#) even reports that the organization treats Iranian patients in Moscow who have been a victim of Israeli attacks, implying that the organization does not align with the Israeli military activities.

Yet, on the website of Hadassah Medical Organization, it is [mentioned](#) that the hospital on Mount Scopus does aim to offer "cutting edge" services to soldiers (and civilians).

However, when looking into the affiliations of the organization, it becomes clear from amongst others an [article from 2013](#), that the Medical School offers a joint medical track, together with the IDF, to train students to become military physicians. The programme, called Tzameret, seems to be ongoing. [This webpage](#) (updated in 2024) even calls the program "Israel's Elite Military Medical program, who provide an essential medical backbone for the IDF". According to the [information on the programme itself](#), the programme was established in 2009 and since "has developed extensive collaborations with institutions in Israel and abroad and provides the essential framework for attracting medical students and expert investigators in each specialized field of military medicine". The programme thus facilitates the military structures.

Concluding, it can be stated that the Organization (which is stated as the partner in the consortium contract) is affiliated with the IDF in their facilitation of the military medical programme.

According to the contract, the aim of the BETTER research project is "(...) to improve research opportunities and patient care through innovative IT solutions. To this end, harmonized framework conditions must be created for uniformly regulated cross-country wide access to the exchange and use of patient data." The webpage on the [project](#) explains further that the research focuses on genetic *inherited retinal dystrophies*. "The proposed study aims to use artificial intelligence to analyse genomic data in combination with clinical data that would allow us to reduce the genetic diagnosis time and improve the clinical management of patients, thus being able to establish personalised medicine in clinical practice." This subject does not have much in common with the research done in the military medical programme.

This page shows the [researchers involved coming from the Hadassah](#), stating that most of them are affiliated with the [Ophthalmology Division](#) at the Medical Center. As the main eye center of Israel, there are of course plenty of occasions where the division/department offers medical services to military casualties, as this article [demonstrates](#), yet the same article also mentions the services offered to the Palestinian and Arab communities.

There are no immediate signs that there are direct relations between the Division of Ophthalmology (part of the school of medicine) and the Institute for Research in Military Medicine are closely connected, other than being part of the same faculty.

Therefore, while the Hadassah Organization as a whole does facilitate military structures, the scientists involved are affiliated with a department that does not have immediate connections to these military structures (as far as we can see).

E. FINANCES/FUNDING:

Does the prospective employee/candidate or project receive funding from a non-Dutch funding agency? If so, from which funding agency?

If not, what other source of funding is used to finance the position/project? Are there any additional conditions or financial interests attached to these funds?

If the prospective employee/candidate receives funding from an organisation under authoritarian control, or if the intended partner organisation is located in an area under authoritarian control, one can check the [Democracy Index](#) rating of that particular area/country. In case the intended collaboration involves entities from countries that score between 0-4 (colour code red-orange), it is necessary to motivate the surplus value as opposed to the risks (e.g. covert influence) towards one's dean.

With regard to China, UM's general policy on China Scholarship Council (CSC) scholarships is as follows:

- No CSC scholarship students in sensitive research areas (see section F);
- No CSC scholarship students from NUDT, the 52 military universities or the 7 Sons Universities (see section D);
- **Accepting:** incoming CSC scholarship students, selected by UM, on UM-based subjects, with PhD supervision in Maastricht. Co-supervision from China is possible, provided that the supervisor and second supervisor from UM are involved in the project;
- Incoming CSC scholarship students for 1 or 2 years with supervision from China will need to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. An important precondition for such collaborations is reciprocity.

Why do we ask this?

Allowing researchers (scholarship students) to work on projects in which sensitive technology is used or developed poses risks. This applies mainly to researchers originating from areas under authoritarian control. These areas/countries often also receive a low score on the [Academic Freedom Index](#). Consequently, there is a risk of covert influence (e.g. by state actors), which can compromise **academic freedom and scientific integrity**.

The source of funding has a direct impact on the security, control and ethical application of knowledge. It

determines who has access to, control over, or can use certain knowledge and technology. This has implications for the protection of strategic, economic and possibly also national interests. Therefore, it is essential that funders/funding sources are carefully assessed in terms of reliability, transparency and strategic interests, in order to safeguard knowledge security and to minimise risks such as undesired or covert influence.

The project is EU funded. Therefore, the conditions are relatively known, lowering the risk of undesired interference. See: <https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/101136262>

F. SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGIES:

Does the subject of research in which the prospective employee/external PhD candidate/visiting researcher is active, or to which the project will contribute to, fall under the category of 'sensitive technologies' and does the collaboration involve a partner from a high-risk area/country?

The combination of sensitive technology and collaboration with an entity from a high-risk area is, in principle, not permitted at UM.

Sensitive technologies, also referred to as 'high risk research areas', include technologies that the Dutch government considers to have specific military, economic and/or geopolitical strategic values.

The following research areas may involve technologies that can be considered sensitive:

<i>Dual Use Technologies</i>	<i>Key Technologies</i>	<i>Emerging Technologies</i>
• High performance computing • Quantum computing • Artificial Intelligence (AI) • Advanced data analytics • Simulation technology • Cybertechnology • Advanced materials • Biotechnology/Life sciences • Nanotechnology • Optica/phonics (ET) • Robotics & autonomous systems • Sensing technologies • Logistics (infrastructure)	• Advanced materials • Chemical technology • Digital technology (incl. AI) • Life science technology • Regenerative medicine	• Artificial Intelligence (AI) • Biotechnology • Blockchain • Smart materials • Sensing technology • (Molecular) imaging

Why do we ask this?

In order to effectively minimise risks, it is necessary to identify sensitive research domains. Sensitive technologies oftentimes have specific strategic, economic or military purposes and values. Knowledge Security policies aim to protect sensitive knowledge from undesired access, espionage, theft or uncontrolled distribution, in order to safeguard national security, our economic competitiveness, and societal stability.

The project involves AI and aims to research gene mutations leading to blindness, which could be categorized under "biotechnology". However, the likeliness of this research being used for malicious purposes is low, since the aim is focused on/narrowed down to identifying the likeliness of blindness due to this very specific gene mutation. Therefore, it is expected that the technology is designed accordingly, narrowed down to the purpose of enhancing eye disease treatments.

G. ETHICAL AND MORAL DILEMMAS:

Are there any (other) ethical or moral dilemmas associated with hiring the prospective candidate or the intended collaboration with the prospective person/organisation?

We must be particularly attentive when collaborating with partners from areas in which fundamental rights are not (always) respected. Examples of ethical or moral dilemmas include violations of human rights or academic values, when the safety of researchers cannot be guaranteed, when there is a risk of oppression or coercion, when knowledge may be misused (wrongful purpose), or when there is a risk of unintended transfer of knowledge (diversion). Also covert influence and interference activities that can lead to (self-)censorship, and thus may undermine academic freedom, can be considered.

Why do we ask this?

The core values of 'academic freedom' and 'scientific integrity' are paramount to UM. When these core values risk to be compromised as a result of an international collaboration, caution is needed. Risk factors include the possibility of pressure and coercion through (state) interference or covert influence.

Moreover, it is highly undesirable to contribute to human rights violations anywhere in the world. **If there are suspicions that a project or partner may contribute to the violation of human rights, please consult the Human Rights Due Diligence Framework (HRDD).**

UM also does not want to collaborate with partners that hinder the transition towards a fossil-free, climate neutral society. **For collaborations with entities that are active within the fossil-fuel industry, please consult the Fossil-free Society assessment framework.**

As stated in section D, the Hadassah Organization, which is the partner in the EU project, facilitates the IDF, jointly with the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Seen the allegations towards the Israeli government and the IDF in relation to the war in Gaza, this affiliation/facilitation does bring forth ethical issues. Entering a collaboration with a partner that could be seen as complicit in the ongoing crimes against the Palestinian people due to their involvement in military (medical) training, even though the involved scientists themselves are not directly involved in these practices. Since no other names of involved scientists are mentioned on the contract, it takes quite some searching to know who exactly is involved in the actual research done, and what the connections are.

The location of the hospital on Mount Scopus is also subject to controversy with a long history, going back to the establishment of Israel and the ongoing occupation (and even further back). The issue still seems to be unresolved, and the area has a long and direct military history.

Other universities, such as Copenhagen University, have struggled with the question whether or not it implies that one is collaborating with an entity on occupied land. Hebrew University denies that the campus is located on occupied land.

The Hadassah Medical Center was founded by the Woman's Zionist Organization of America.

Looking into this organisation, the name Zionist could potentially have ethical implications (due to its connotation). However, there are no clear indications that the organisation holds extreme views that point into the direction of ethical issues. The organisation was established in 1912 under the same name, so the name has to be put in the context of that history. The organisation does support the state of Israel, but they don't have any statements supporting the actions in Gaza using Zionism as a justification. No records have been found of other ethically dubious practices.

At the same time, the Woman's Zionist Organization of America, together with the Israel Land Authority, do not want to disclose information about land purchase in western Jerusalem, which, in the light of the ongoing land disputes, may create moral suspicions.

H. SENSITIVE (PERSONAL) DATA:

Does the intended collaboration or project make use of, or produce personal data or technologically sensitive data (see also section F)?

If so: has there already been drafted a Data Management Plan (DMP)?

According to UM's Open Science policy (2022-2026), UM strives to make Open Sciences practices the norm, using the credo "as open as possible, as closed as necessary". This ambition may induce some knowledge security risks. An important aspect of knowledge security concerns the risk of leakage of data, information or knowledge, in any form possible. Most research involves the usage of, or creation of data. **In most occasions, it is therefore necessary or desired to draft a Data Management Plan (DMP), which describes how data can be collected, stored and shared safely, following GDPR guidelines. For more information, consult this [link](#).**

Why do we ask this?

When using or creating (research) data, the data may be subject to privacy (GDPR) laws. In some cases, there may be patentable knowledge involved.

When collaborating with a foreign organisation/entity or when hiring staff from high-risk areas, there is a risk of covert influence. Besides that this can lead to data security issues, it can negatively impact the quality of the data. Therefore, a robust approach, in which technological safety measures go hand in hand with legal regulation and ethical awareness, is of crucial importance for safeguarding knowledge security. In this way, technological progress can be achieved, while simultaneously guaranteeing the security of sensitive knowledge.

The details concerning the sharing of data has been explained and laid out in the contract. No personal data will be shared within the project, as stated in the contract.

Sensitive Partnerships Unit (BU)

From: 5.1 lid 2 e
Sent: Friday, 4 July 2025 15:12
To: Sensitive Partnerships Unit (BU)
Cc: 5.1 lid 2 e
Subject: RE: Internationale Samenwerking ESCRS TORIC study

Dag 5.1 lid 2 e

Dank voor de update. Graag een kennisveiligheidsadvies inderdaad.

Alvast dank,

Groeten, 5.1 lid 2 e

From: Sensitive Partnerships Unit (BU) <spu@maastrichtuniversity.nl>
Sent: Friday, July 4, 2025 11:32 AM
To: 5.1 lid 2 e
Cc: 5.1 lid 2 e
Subject: RE: Internationale Samenwerking ESCRS TORIC study

Beste 5.1 lid 2 e

Zoals beloofd zou ik nog even terugkoppeling geven na de meeting met de commissie mensenrechten. Wat betreft onderstaande casus kan ik bevestigen: deze valt inderdaad niet onder de noemer 'bestuurlijk-strategische partnerschappen'. De commissie mensenrechten hoeft dus voor een samenwerking als deze geen advies op te stellen voor het CvB. Dat het betreffende Medical Center geaffilieerd is met Hebrew University is goed om te weten, maar heeft verder inderdaad geen "consequenties" in die zin voor de mogelijkheid (of onmogelijkheid) om een samenwerking aan te gaan. In principe zijn er dus geen regels of policies die een dergelijk verband blokkeren.

Mocht je dat graag willen, dan kunnen we dus wel een kennisveiligheidsadvies opstellen. Een stukje mensenrechten (of ethische issues) worden daarin uiteraard ook meegenomen.

Wil je me nog even bevestigen of je graag een kennisveiligheidsadvies voor deze casus had gewenst?

Wat betreft de statusupdate van de twee andere casussen van SHE: doordat deze twee consultancy-overeenkomsten direct met een overheidsorganisatie in Israël zijn, gaat de commissie deze dus wel nader bekijken. Dit staat gepland om deze zomer te doen. Ik hou je op de hoogte.

Hartelijke groet,

5.1 lid 2 e

[Redacted signature block]

[Redacted signature block]

[Redacted signature block]

From: [redacted] 5.1 lid 2 e
Sent: 01 July 2025 08:24
To: Sensitive Partnerships Unit (BU) <spu@maastrichtuniversity.nl>
Cc: [redacted] 5.1 lid 2 e
Subject: RE: Internationale Samenwerking ESCRS TORIC study

Dankjewel voor de update, [redacted] 5.1 lid 2 e
Wat mij betreft prima om de casus donderdag in te brengen.

Met vriendelijke groet,

[redacted] 5.1 lid 2 e

From: Sensitive Partnerships Unit (BU) <spu@maastrichtuniversity.nl>
Sent: Monday, June 30, 2025 4:10 PM
To: [redacted] 5.1 lid 2 e
Cc: [redacted] 5.1 lid 2 e
Subject: RE: Internationale Samenwerking ESCRS TORIC study

Beste [redacted] 5.1 lid 2 e

Ik geloof dat er nog geen antwoord is gekomen op deze aanvraag.

Kijkend naar de inhoud van de samenwerking, me baserend op de info in de ingevulde TISK I, lijkt het hier te gaan om een samenwerking op projectbasis, en is er bij deze casus **geen** sprake van een strategische samenwerking op bestuurlijk niveau. Dat betekent dat er geen verplichte partnertoets voor mensenrechten hoeft te worden gedaan (waarbij advies wordt opgesteld voor het CvB), met betrekking tot dit project. Wel kunnen we uiteraard vrijblijvend advies geven, ons baserend op de kennisveiligheidskaders en de individuele activiteitentoets mensenrechten.

Wat betreft de partner, het Shaare Zedek Medical Center, is het goed om even te benoemen dat het geaffilieerd is met de Hebrew University of Jerusalem. De UM heeft namelijk wel een ander (momenteel bevroren) strategisch partnerschap met die universiteit die momenteel door de commissie mensenrechten wordt beoordeeld (ter advisering aan het CvB), en ik denk dat het goed is voor de commissie om rekening te houden met mogelijke andere, niet-strategische samenwerkingen met deze instelling (of onderdelen hiervan). Daarmee bedoel ik te zeggen dat het belangrijk is voor de commissie om na te denken over mogelijke andere implicaties van het advies dat ze uit gaan brengen aan het CvB m.b.t. het strategische partnerschap met de Hebrew University. Met die "andere implicaties" doel ik dan op gevolgen voor mogelijke samenwerkingen op individueel niveau.

Individuele projecten zouden namelijk, uiteraard onder voorwaarde dat ze niet bijdragen aan mogelijke schending van mensenrechten of andere grote (kennisveiligheids)risico's met zich meebrengen, in principe moeten kunnen doorgaan, zolang er ook van bovenaf geen restricties of sancties worden opgelegd. Van dergelijke restricties of sancties van bovenaf is er momenteel (nog) geen sprake.

Aankomende donderdag zit de commissie opnieuw samen.

Ik stel voor dat ik de casus dan heel kort voorleg, puur om de commissie te vragen om een indicatie te geven met betrekking tot de mogelijke implicaties van het op te stellen advies over het strategische partnerschap met Hebrew University op andere vormen van samenwerking met (onderdelen van) die entiteit. Zodra dat helder is, kan ik namelijk met meer zekerheid ook een vrijblijvend advies opstellen voor deze casus.

Ik zal dan na de meeting zo snel mogelijk opnieuw contact met je opnemen, is dat in orde?

(Overigens zal ik donderdag ook om een statusupdate m.b.t. de andere liggende casussen vragen.)

Met hartelijke groet,

5.1 lid 2 e

From: 5.1 lid 2 e
Sent: 19 June 2025 18:03
To: 5.1 lid 2 e
Cc: 5.1 lid 2 e
Subject: FW: Internationale Samenwerking ESCRS TORIC study

Beste 5.1 lid 2 e

In de bijlage vind je de casus waarover we eerder contact hadden. Ik wil jullie graag om advies vragen op basis van het ingevulde toetsingskader in de bijlage.

Alvast mijn dank.

Groeten, 5.1 lid 2 e

From: 5.1 lid 2 e
Sent: Thursday, June 19, 2025 2:07 PM
To: 5.1 lid 2 e
Cc: 5.1 lid 2 e
Subject: Internationale Samenwerking ESCRS TORIC study

Geachte 5.1 lid 2 e

Voor onze studie binnen de Oogheelkunde willen wij patiënten includeren in het Shaare Zedek Medical Center in Israël.

Wij hebben vernomen dat dit eerst besproken dient te worden binnen de Raad van Bestuur.


In de bijlage vindt u het ingevulde formulier Toetsingskader Internationale Samenwerking. Mocht u hier nog vragen over hebben, dan hoor ik dat uiteraard graag.

Mede namens 5.1 lid 2 e

Met vriendelijke groet,

5.1 lid 2 e

5.1 lid 2 e



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From: Letschert, Rianne (CVB)
To: 5.1 lid 2 e
Subject: Request for a meeting
Date: woensdag 9 juli 2025 16:14:29

Dear 5.1 lid 2 e

I am reaching out to you with a rather sensitive topic. Our university and your organisation have a partnership together with regard to developing funding proposals together.

In general, we approach our global engagement with countries and partners where human rights are under pressure with "yes, we collaborate, unless we have major concerns". At the same time, we find it important that Maastricht University itself and our institutional strategic partners are not contributing in any way to serious violations of human rights or international crimes.

I am writing to let you know that – in line with this policy - our Human Rights Advisory Committee is currently starting to assess our institutional strategic partnerships in a number of countries or regions where there are significant signals that such violations take place, including but not limited to Israel. This includes an HRDD assessment of the partnership we have.

Given that your institution has been a valued partner to us, I would like to personally discuss the background to our assessment with you, if possible. Would you be willing to schedule a phone call so that we can discuss the aim of the assessment and our further process, and for you to share any concerns you may have on our evaluation process? Looking forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

Rianne Letschert

Prof.dr. Rianne Letschert
Bestuursvoorzitter/ President

5.1 lid 2 e

From: 5.1 lid 2 e
To: 5.1 lid 2 e
Subject: Fwd: Contact information needed | Collaboration Maastricht University - Rabin Medical Center
Date: maandag 14 juli 2025 07:26:36
Attachments: [image005.png](#)
[image004.jpg](#)

Dear 5.1 lid 2 e
My name is Prof 5.1 lid 2 e I'm the 5.1 lid 2 e and also serve as
5.1 lid 2 e of Rabin Medical Center.

I received the email below, and would like to follow on it.

I am aware of an ongoing collaboration of your institution with 5.1 lid 2 e
which we encourage, of course.

I would like to kindly ask whether your approach below regards this specific collaboration? Or perhaps it is aimed to broaden the collaboration in a more general sense?

All the best

5.1 lid 2 e

[Redacted signature block]

From: 5.1 lid 2 e
Sent: Monday, July 7, 2025 4:16 PM
To: 5.1 lid 2 e
Subject: Contact information needed | Collaboration Maastricht University - Rabin Medical Center
Importance: High

Dear 5.1 lid 2 e

Greetings from the Netherlands. My name is 5.1 lid 2 e and I work for Maastricht University as a 5.1 lid 2 e

I am contacting you on behalf of our President, prof.dr. Rianne Letschert, who would like to get in direct contact with 5.1 lid 2 e to discuss the cooperation between our institutions.
Could you provide me with the contact details (email address) 5.1 lid 2 e

Thank you in advance.

Kind regards,

[image004.jpg]

5.1 lid 2 e
[Redacted signature block]

[Redacted signature block]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Sensitive Partnerships Unit (BU)

From: 5.1 lid 2 e
Sent: Monday, 21 July 2025 09:15
To: Sensitive Partnerships Unit (BU)
Cc: 5.1 lid 2 e
Subject: RE: Internationale Samenwerking ESCRS TORIC study

Dag 5.1 lid 2 e

Hierbij de informatie over de financiering van deze studie, zoals vorige week besproken.

Geachte 5.1 lid 2 e

Hieronder treft u een overzicht aan van studie gerelateerde kostenposten en bijbehorende maximale bedragen. Deze kunnen enkel gedeclareerd worden aan de hand van facturen voor gemaakte kosten.

buiten scope, 5.1 lid 1 c, 5.1 lid 2 f, 5.1 lid 2 i

Hopende u hiermee voldoende geïnformeerd te hebben.

Met vriendelijke groet,

5.1 lid 2 e

From: Sensitive Partnerships Unit (BU) <spu@maastrichtuniversity.nl>
Sent: Tuesday, July 15, 2025 4:12 PM
To: 5.1 lid 2 e
Cc: 5.1 lid 2 e
Subject: RE: Internationale Samenwerking ESCRS TORIC study

Hoi 5.1 lid 2 e

Zeker, donderdag om 15:30u heb ik tijd voor een meeting. Teams is prima. Ik zal een uitnodiging sturen.

Hartelijke groet,

5.1 lid 2 e

From: [redacted] 5.1 lid 2 e
Sent: 15 July 2025 16:01
To: Sensitive Partnerships Unit (BU) <spu@maastrichtuniversity.nl>
Cc: [redacted] 5.1 lid 2 e
Subject: RE: Internationale Samenwerking ESCRS TORIC study

Dag [redacted] 5.1 lid 2 e

Dank voor je uitgebreide reflectie. Ik heb dit thema vandaag in het bestuur besproken en praat graag met je door om van gedachten te wisselen. Zou je bv aanstaande donderdag om 15.30u kunnen via Teams?

Groeten, [redacted] 5.1 lid 2 e

From: Sensitive Partnerships Unit (BU) <spu@maastrichtuniversity.nl>
Sent: Monday, July 14, 2025 11:03 AM
To: [redacted] 5.1 lid 2 e
Cc: [redacted] 5.1 lid 2 e
Subject: RE: Internationale Samenwerking ESCRS TORIC study

Beste [redacted] 5.1 lid 2 e

Ik mail je even over de casus aangaande de data-uitwisseling met het Shaare Zedek, Medical Center in Israël. Mijn collega [redacted] 5.1 lid 2 e en ik hebben een kennisveiligheidstoets uitgevoerd, en we komen toch wel tot de conclusie dat er een aantal ethische issues uit de analyse zijn gekomen, die we graag met je willen bespreken. De bevindingen maken het wat lastig om tot een eenduidige conclusie, en dus advies te komen.

Ter samenvatting:

Ondanks dat de afdeling (Ophthalmology) zelf in principe geen ethische bezwaren met zich meebrengt, heeft het Shaare Zedek Medical Center zelf verschillende (nauwe) banden met het IDF (Israeli Defence Force):

- Het medisch centrum heeft een gezamenlijke hub met een investeringsgroep, en die investeringsgroep heeft de meerderheid van de aandelen in een venture dat direct betrokken is bij het ontwikkelen van dual-use en militaire technologie voor het IDF. Er zijn verschillende bronnen die de militaire belangen/interesses benadrukken van zowel het medisch centrum als diens directe samenwerkingspartners. Dit gaat dan niet enkel om lopende projecten, maar ook om ambities voor toekomstige projecten (dus strategische ontwikkelingen e.d.). Met andere woorden: het Medical Center is dus indirect, maar zeker aantoonbaar betrokken bij militaire projecten binnen Israël (meer details hebben we beschikbaar, maar is wat te uitgebreid voor deze mail).
- Een deel van de wetenschappers van het Medisch Centrum speelt tevens een sleutelrol binnen de veldhospitals van het IDF. Niet per definitie enkel nu in de oorlog, maar door de tijd heen gezien zijn er bronnen die aangeven dat het hier om een langlopende samenwerking gaat. [redacted] 5.1 lid 2 e
- Wellicht een ietwat afwijkend punt, maar ook waard te benoemen: het medisch centrum lijkt bovendien een duidelijk 'pro-life' standpunt aan te houden (d.w.z: anti-abortus, op religieuze gronden). Vooral de Nederlandse tak van het medisch centrum is hier zeer duidelijk in. Gezien de recente inspanningen van het Europees Parlement om abortus op te nemen in het EU Fundamental Rights charter, kan dit punt mogelijk ook tot ethische bezwaren leiden bij samenwerkingen met het medisch centrum.

Het grootste issue is eigenlijk dat het financieren van dit medisch centrum (ook al is die financiering direct bedoeld voor het dekken van de gemaakte kosten van de behandelingen, of in elk geval bedoeld als directe betaling voor de geleverde data) indirect kan bijdragen aan de instandhouding van het militaire apparaat.

Financieringsstromen zijn moeilijk te controleren wanneer ze eenmaal bij de partner zijn aangekomen, en we weten simpelweg dan niet of ze mogelijk ook deels naar de projecten gaan met militair doeleinde (of andere ethisch bezwaarlijke of dubieuze projecten).

Concluderend kunnen we daarmee zeggen dat het uitwisselen van de data (waar wij geen bezwaren tegen hebben) op het gebied van oogheelkunde helemaal in orde is. Ook met de afdeling Ophthalmology van het medisch centrum (want de afdeling zelf lijkt ons ook in orde). Onze twijfel gaat met name uit naar de financiële compensatie aan het centrum, gezien de ethisch toch wel bezwaarlijke affiliaties die zij onderhouden, en het daarmee economisch steunen van die structuren.

Graag zouden we dan ook van jou horen of jij eventueel meer weet over de financiële compensatie voor de geleverde data, en of we kunnen vaststellen of de betaling ook daadwerkelijk enkel en alleen gebruikt zal/kan worden voor het dekken van de kosten van de behandelingen. Dat zou namelijk een deel van de ethische bezwaren verlichten.

Normaal gesproken zou ik dit eerst ook even met 5.1 lid 2 bespreken, zeker gezien onze twijfels, 5.1 lid 2 e. Het duurt daarom helaas nog even voordat ik het haar kan voorleggen. In de tussentijd zijn we wel benieuwd wat jouw gedachten zijn van dergelijke affiliaties en de bevindingen zoals hierboven genoemd.

Met hartelijke groet,

5.1 lid 2 e

From: 5.1 lid 2 e
Sent: 04 July 2025 15:12
To: Sensitive Partnerships Unit (BU) <spu@maastrichtuniversity.nl>
Cc: 5.1 lid 2 e
Subject: RE: Internationale Samenwerking ESCRS TORIC study

Dag 5.1 lid 2 e

Dank voor de update. Graag een kennisveiligheidsadvies inderdaad.

Alvast dank,

Groeten, 5.1 lid 2 e

From: Sensitive Partnerships Unit (BU) <spu@maastrichtuniversity.nl>
Sent: Friday, July 4, 2025 11:32 AM
To: 5.1 lid 2 e

Cc: [redacted] 5.1 lid 2 e
Subject: RE: Internationale Samenwerking ESCRS TORIC study

Beste [redacted] 5.1 lid 2 e

Zoals beloofd zou ik nog even terugkoppeling geven na de meeting met de commissie mensenrechten. Wat betreft onderstaande casus kan ik bevestigen: deze valt inderdaad niet onder de noemer 'bestuurlijk-strategische partnerschappen'. De commissie mensenrechten hoeft dus voor een samenwerking als deze geen advies op te stellen voor het CvB. Dat het betreffende Medical Center geaffilieerd is met Hebrew University is goed om te weten, maar heeft verder inderdaad geen "consequenties" in die zin voor de mogelijkheid (of onmogelijkheid) om een samenwerking aan te gaan. In principe zijn er dus geen regels of policies die een dergelijk verband blokkeren.

Mocht je dat graag willen, dan kunnen we dus wel een kennisveiligheidsadvies opstellen. Een stukje mensenrechten (of ethische issues) worden daarin uiteraard ook meegenomen.

Wil je me nog even bevestigen of je graag een kennisveiligheidsadvies voor deze casus had gewenst?

Wat betreft de statusupdate van de twee andere casussen van SHE: doordat deze twee consultancy-overeenkomsten direct met een overheidsorganisatie in Israël zijn, gaat de commissie deze dus wel nader bekijken. Dit staat gepland om deze zomer te doen. Ik hou je op de hoogte.

Hartelijke groet,

[redacted] 5.1 lid 2 e

From: [redacted] 5.1 lid 2 e
Sent: 01 July 2025 08:24
To: Sensitive Partnerships Unit (BU) <spu@maastrichtuniversity.nl>
Cc: [redacted] 5.1 lid 2 e
Subject: RE: Internationale Samenwerking ESCRS TORIC study

Dankjewel voor de update, [redacted] 5.1 lid 2 e
Wat mij betreft prima om de casus donderdag in te brengen.

Met vriendelijke groet,

[redacted] 5.1 lid 2 e

From: Sensitive Partnerships Unit (BU) <spu@maastrichtuniversity.nl>
Sent: Monday, June 30, 2025 4:10 PM
To: [redacted] 5.1 lid 2 e
Cc: [redacted] 5.1 lid 2 e
Subject: RE: Internationale Samenwerking ESCRS TORIC study

Beste 5.1 lid 2 e

Ik geloof dat er nog geen antwoord is gekomen op deze aanvraag.

Kijkend naar de inhoud van de samenwerking, me baserend op de info in de ingevulde TISK I, lijkt het hier te gaan om een samenwerking op projectbasis, en is er bij deze casus **geen** sprake van een strategische samenwerking op bestuurlijk niveau. Dat betekent dat er geen verplichte partnertoets voor mensenrechten hoeft te worden gedaan (waarbij advies wordt opgesteld voor het CvB), met betrekking tot dit project. Wel kunnen we uiteraard vrijblijvend advies geven, ons baserend op de kennisveiligheidskaders en de individuele activiteitentoets mensenrechten.

Wat betreft de partner, het Shaare Zedek Medical Center, is het goed om even te benoemen dat het geaffilieerd is met de Hebrew University of Jerusalem. De UM heeft namelijk wel een ander (momenteel bevroren) strategisch partnerschap met die universiteit die momenteel door de commissie mensenrechten wordt beoordeeld (ter advisering aan het CvB), en ik denk dat het goed is voor de commissie om rekening te houden met mogelijke andere, niet-strategische samenwerkingen met deze instelling (of onderdelen hiervan). Daarmee bedoel ik te zeggen dat het belangrijk is voor de commissie om na te denken over mogelijke andere implicaties van het advies dat ze uit gaan brengen aan het CvB m.b.t. het strategische partnerschap met de Hebrew University. Met die "andere implicaties" doel ik dan op gevolgen voor mogelijke samenwerkingen op individueel niveau.

Individuele projecten zouden namelijk, uiteraard onder voorwaarde dat ze niet bijdragen aan mogelijke schending van mensenrechten of andere grote (kennisveiligheids)risico's met zich meebrengen, in principe moeten kunnen doorgaan, zolang er ook van bovenaf geen restricties of sancties worden opgelegd. Van dergelijke restricties of sancties van bovenaf is er momenteel (nog) geen sprake.

Aankomende donderdag zit de commissie opnieuw samen.

Ik stel voor dat ik de casus dan heel kort voorleg, puur om de commissie te vragen om een indicatie te geven met betrekking tot de mogelijke implicaties van het op te stellen advies over het strategische partnerschap met Hebrew University op andere vormen van samenwerking met (onderdelen van) die entiteit. Zodra dat helder is, kan ik namelijk met meer zekerheid ook een vrijblijvend advies opstellen voor deze casus.

Ik zal dan na de meeting zo snel mogelijk opnieuw contact met je opnemen, is dat in orde?

(Overigens zal ik donderdag ook om een statusupdate m.b.t. de andere liggende casussen vragen.)

Met hartelijke groet,

5.1 lid 2 e

From: 5.1 lid 2 e

Sent: 19 June 2025 18:03

To: 5.1 lid 2 e

Cc: [redacted] 5.1 lid 2 e
Subject: FW: Internationale Samenwerking ESCRS TORIC study

Beste [redacted] 5.1 lid 2 e

In de bijlage vind je de casus waarover we eerder contact hadden. Ik wil jullie graag om advies vragen op basis van het ingevulde toetsingskader in de bijlage.

Alvast mijn dank.

Groeten, [redacted] 5.1 lid 2 e

From: [redacted] 5.1 lid 2 e
Sent: Thursday, June 19, 2025 2:07 PM
To: [redacted] 5.1 lid 2 e
Cc: [redacted] 5.1 lid 2 e
Subject: Internationale Samenwerking ESCRS TORIC study

Geachte [redacted] 5.1 lid 2 e

Voor onze studie binnen de Oogheelkunde willen wij patiënten includeren in het Shaare Zedek Medical Center in Israël.

Wij hebben vernomen dat dit eerst besproken dient te worden binnen de Raad van Bestuur.

In de bijlage vindt u het ingevulde formulier Toetsingskader Internationale Samenwerking. Mocht u hier nog vragen over hebben, dan hoor ik dat uiteraard graag.

Mede namens [redacted] 5.1 lid 2 e

Met vriendelijke groet,

[redacted] 5.1 lid 2 e

Secretariaat-jz (BU)

Van: Sensitive Partnerships Unit (BU)
Verzonden: Wednesday, 6 August 2025 13:37
Aan: 5.1 lid 2 e
CC: 5.1 lid 2 e
Onderwerp: RE: BIOPYRANIA partner Hydrolite

Beste 5.1 lid 2 e

Hartelijk dank voor je bericht. Excuus vanuit mij voor de vertraagde reactie wegens de vakantieperiode. Goed dat je ons dit onder de aandacht brengt.

Als ik het goed begrijp is het issue in dit geval dat bij onderstaand project een partner betrokken is dat banden heeft met het Israëlische Ministerie van Defensie.

Nu kan ik al wel benoemen dat de UM mensenrechtencommissie al wel een landentoets heeft uitgevoerd m.b.t. Israël/Palestina (zie ook <https://umemployee.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/groups/human-rights-advisory-committee-hrac/390/wall>), waarin geconcludeerd wordt dat “there are serious indications that Israel has committed and continues to commit multiple international crimes and serious human rights violations, including war crimes, crimes against humanity, and potentially acts of genocide.” Hiermee zou je dus kunnen concluderen dat de regering zich schuldig maakt aan mensenrechtenschendingen (en dus het Ministerie van Defensie aldaar).

Het project heeft daarmee indirect banden met een partij die door de commissie wordt aangewezen als problematisch.

Nu is het euvel in dit geval ook dat het hier gaat om een Horizon Europe project, met een beperkte duur.

In alle voorgaande discussies rondom het Human Rights Due Diligence-beleid is na veel beraad uiteindelijk overeengekomen dat er verschillende procedures moeten gelden voor *Institutioneel-Bestuurlijke* Partnerschappen, en voor partnerschappen/samenwerkingen die *niet* onder die noemer vallen.

Wanneer de commissie zich buigt over een institutioneel-bestuurlijke partnerschap, dan stellen zij advies op voor het CvB, en moet het CvB uiteindelijk beslissen of de samenwerking voortgang kan vinden (op basis van dit adviesrapport). Als het niet onder de noemer valt, kan er alsnog vrijblijvend advies worden aangevraagd, al zal dat advies dan niet gaan naar het CvB ter beoordeling, maar naar de aanvrager zelf. Dat advies (over niet-bestuurlijk-strategische partnerschappen) heeft ook geen bindend karakter.

Ondanks dat de scheidingslijn tussen wat onder de noemer bestuurlijk-strategisch valt – en wat niet – niet in alle gevallen even helder is, kan ik al wel zeggen dat een Horizon Europe-project als deze **niet** valt onder de noemer bestuurlijk-strategisch. Dit heeft te maken met het kortdurende, projectmatige karakter.

Zonder verder in te gaan op de logica of wenselijkheid van die scheidingslijn, betekent dit voor de beoordeling van dit project (en de aanwezigheid van een partner met banden met het Israëlische Ministerie van Defensie) dus dat de commissie in dit geval niet het mandaat heeft om een advies af te geven voor het CvB over dit project (en de direct/indirect betrokken partijen). *Wel* kan er vrijblijvend advies aangevraagd worden, wat, gezien de eerdere uitspraak van de commissie wat betreft de daden van Israël, wellicht wel wenselijk is?

Ik kan de situatie zeker even voorleggen aan de commissie, mocht je dat willen?

Met hartelijke groet,

5.1 lid 2 e

5.1 lid 2 e

From: 5.1 lid 2 e

Sent: 24 July 2025 09:38

To: Sensitive Partnerships Unit (BU)

Cc: 5.1 lid 2 e

Subject: BIOPYRANIA partner Hydrolite

Beste collega's,

In afwachting van de uitkomst van het HRAC breng ik graag de volgende casus onder de aandacht. BIOPYRANIA is een Horizon Europe project dat gecoördineerd wordt door UM (AMIBM). Het project is afgelopen oktober van start gegaan en heeft een looptijd van 4 jaar. Één van de partners in het project is het Israëlische bedrijf Hydrolite. Gisteren zag ik per toeval dat zij onder partners op hun website het Israëlische ministerie van Defensie noemen als hun partner.

Zie hieronder enkele screenshots.

Met vriendelijke groeten,

5.1 lid 2 e



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
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